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OVERVIEW
In recent months, despite the uncertainty generated by certain geopolitical events, 
domestic and international financial markets have – with additional support from monetary 
policies – been relatively stable. This stability has been manifest in low levels of volatility, 
across-the-board reductions in risk premia, declines in government and private debt 
yields, and rises in stock market indices. The valuation of debt and equity issued by the 
banking sector, in particular in Europe, has remained highly sensitive. That mirrors the 
markets’ concern about the prospects for the sector’s profitability against a background of 
weak economic growth, squeezed net interest margins, a still-high level of NPLs in certain 
banking systems and greater regulatory requirements.
Global economic activity has continued to post very moderate growth as a result of the 
slowdown in the advanced countries and the stabilisation of the emerging economies. In 
recent months, moreover, the international economic outlook has continued to be revised 
downwards. The Spanish economy has shown greater strength than expected during the 
first half of this year, posting quarter-on-quarter growth rates of 0.8% in the first two 
quarters. INE’s flash estimate of GDP in Q3 shows notable growth (0.7%), albeit somewhat 
down on that of the previous quarters. In the medium term a gradual slowdown is forecast, 
underpinned by the tailing off of certain recent expansionary impulses, such as the fall in 
oil prices, the considerable looseness of financing conditions, the depreciation of the euro 
and the expansionary fiscal policy stance.
Spanish deposit institutions have maintained the modest growth shown in the latest 
Financial Stability Reports (FSR). Specifically, their consolidated assets grew by 0.4% 
year-on-year in June 2016, owing essentially to their international activity, which offsets 
the effects of the reduction in loans to households and firms in their banking business in 
Spain. Against this background of low activity and low interest rates, consolidated income 
during the first half of this year fell by 23.6%, entailing a return on equity of around 6%. 
Lower asset impairment losses (–21.4% in provisions) have, to some extent, enabled the 
reduction in margins to be offset. In terms of business in Spain the situation is similar, with 
a narrowing in the interest margin of 9.4% compared with that in the first half of last year. 
In any event, the improvement in economic activity in Spain has enabled the volume of 
deposit institutions’ NPLs and forborne exposures to continue declining. In particular, 
NPLs have fallen by 38% since December 2013.
Spanish institutions’ solvency continues to comfortably exceed the regulatory minimum 
levels. As at June 2016, the common equity tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio stood at 12.4%. In 
addition, a forward-looking assessment of the Spanish banking system’s resilience 
described in this Report shows that, at the aggregate level, in the face of an adverse 
macroeconomic scenario, the Spanish banking system would, at the end of the time 
horizon set, see a significant reduction in its capital levels; but even so, it would manage 
to maintain solvency above the minimum regulatory level required. This conclusion 
matches that arising from the stress test conducted by the European Banking Authority 
(EBA) for a sample of representative European banks (six of them Spanish).
Identified below are the main risk factors for the stability of the Spanish financial
system.
1 Key developments
2 Risk factors
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These three risk factors coincide with those highlighted in the previous FSR and, as 
discussed, these factors are interrelated, meaning that, should any of them materialise, the 
consequences might be the reactivation of either of the other two. These risk factors 
affect, to a greater or lesser extent, Spain’s European partners; accordingly, the various 
European authorities signal them as the main risks affecting the European banking system 
as a whole. Domestically, certain factors of risk linked to the uncertainty over the future 
thrust of economies policies also persist.
The current environment of very low interest rates, along with a still-very-limited volume of 
new banking business and a still-high level of non-productive assets, weighs down on the 
income-generating capacity of Spanish deposit institutions. Chart A shows that, in line 
with the decline in market interest rates, the return on assets and the cost of liabilities also 
fall, although the room for further decline in this latter variable tends to lessen as the 
interest rates on retail deposits, which are the bulk of liabilities, draw closer to zero. The 
upshot of this development, along with other factors, is that net interest income per unit of 
asset is close to all-time lows.
The high volume of non-productive assets on bank balance sheets exerts downward 
pressure on the income statement (Chart B). In any event, the notable and continuous 
reduction in the volume of assets classified as non-performing further to the improved 
macroeconomic conditions and the lesser interest burden associated with loans bearing 
lower interest rates, as a result of the monetary policy pursued by the European Central 
Bank (ECB), alleviates the pressure which, via margins, is exerted on Spanish institutions’ 
income statement.
2.1  LOW PROFITABILITY 
OF SPANISH BANKING 
BUSINESS
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Colour ranking in the table is as follows: green denotes no risk, yellow is low risk, orange is medium risk and red is high risk. The time horizon for which these risks 
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Against this backdrop of depressed margins which, foreseeably, will be protracted, it is 
expected that institutions will persevere in their efforts to increase efficiency through cost-
cutting and in turn explore alternative income sources. Also, in specific cases, they might 
consider possible corporate operations, which of themselves usually provide for gains in 
efficiency in the medium term.
Global economic activity has continued to post very modest growth, as a result of the 
widespread slowdown in the advanced economies and of the stabilisation of the pace of 
growth in the emerging economies. Moreover, the growth outlook has continued to be 
revised downwards (see Charts C and D). Behind this behaviour of global economic activity 
lie various structural and conjunctural factors. In the case of the Spanish economy, 
economic growth in recent quarters has held relatively high, although a gradual slowdown 
is forecast for 2017 and 2018.
In respect of this baseline scenario of economic growth at the domestic and international 
levels, the risks of a more unfavourable trend arising continue to outweigh those pointing 
in the opposite direction. Specifically, at the global level, there are risks linked both to a 
downturn in the macroeconomic outlook for certain more vulnerable emerging economies 
and to geopolitical tensions. In the euro area, the risks include most notably those linked 
to future negotiations on the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union (EU), to 
various upcoming elections and to migratory issues and security problems, and their 
potential effect on agents’ confidence.
Along with the foregoing external factors, the Spanish economy is exposed to domestic 
risks. These include most notably uncertainty over the future course of economic policies 
and, in particular, over the ultimate budgetary measures needed to meet the budget deficit 
targets to 2018 agreed with the European Council in August and the structural reforms our 
economy requires to raise its potential growth.
The materialisation of any of the foregoing risks might have a negative impact on economic 
growth in Spain or in countries to which Spanish banks are exposed, which would exert an 
adverse effect on the quality of their assets.
The recent course of domestic and international financial markets has been one of relative 
stability, reflected in low volatility levels for both fixed-income and variable-yield 
instruments, in across-the-board reductions in risk premia and declines in government 
and private debt yields (see Charts E and F), and in a particularly marked recovery in the 
2.2  DETERIORATION IN THE 
GROWTH OUTLOOK FOR 
THE INTERNATIONAL AND 
SPANISH ECONOMIES
2.3  RISKS SURROUNDING 
FINANCIAL ASSET PRICES
SOURCE: Consensus Forecasts.
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financial markets of those emerging countries that had been considered as most vulnerable. 
Despite the current relative stability, the future course of asset prices is conditional upon 
the potential changes in agents’ expectations or in their attitude to risk, especially in a 
setting in which the valuations of certain instruments have reached their highest levels of 
recent years. Thus, for instance, a possible materialisation of some of the risks to economic 
growth previously signalled might lead to a correction in prices. Such a correction would 
translate into asset impairment and into a worsening of financing conditions, affecting – to 
a greater or lesser degree – all economic sectors, including the financial sector, with the 
immediate effect of a downturn in their profit outlook.
As on previous occasions, the aforementioned risks are analysed in greater detail 
throughout this FSR in an attempt to show their possible impact on the financial system, 
in particular on the activities pursued by Spanish deposit institutions, and their potential 
repercussions on these institutions’ solvency.
Chapter 3, along the lines established in the previous FSR, is devoted to describing the 
macroprudential policy stance pursued by the Banco de España in recent months. 
Specifically, for 2016 Q4, the decision – based on the technical analysis of specific 
quantitative indicators, and on qualitative information and expert judgement – has been to 
hold at 0% the percentage of the countercyclical capital buffer applicable to credit 
exposures in Spain. In addition, the chapter includes a description of the arrangements for 
the reciprocity of macroprudential measures in the EU.
3  Analysis and 
macroprudential policy
SOURCE: Datastream.
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1  MACROECONOMIC RISKS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
Since the publication of the last FSR, global economic activity has continued to show very 
modest growth, down indeed on that in 2015. This has been the outcome of the across-
the-board slowdown in the advanced economies and the stabilisation – albeit as part of a 
mixed pattern – of the pace of growth in the emerging economies.
Furthermore, economic prospects have continued to be revised downwards (see Charts 
1.1.A and B), in an economic setting characterised by low inflation rates and very low 
interest rates. Behind this markedly weak behaviour of global economic activity lie long-
term supply-constraining factors, such as population ageing, long-term unemployment 
and the slowdown in productivity, which feed back into the persistent sluggishness of 
demand, and of investment in particular, in clear contrast to the improvement in financing 
conditions (see Charts 1.1.C and D). Compounding these factors, more recently, has been 
the notable weakness of global trade, which may also be reflecting a degree of stagnation 
in global integration and a certain rise in protectionist policies.
The unexpected UK referendum result on continuing EU membership prompted significant 
turbulence on financial markets and a degree of pessimism in agents’ expectations. 
However, the markets picked up relatively swiftly, and the latest economic indicators 
1.1  External environment 
of the euro area 
The growth outlook for the 
global economy has continued 
to be revised downwards…
… while certain economic 
and geopolitical trouble spots 
have emerged
SOURCES: Consensus Forecasts, AMECO, OECD and WEO (April 2016).
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increase in tariff and non-tariff barriers cannot be ruled out, which 
would have an adverse bearing on British producers’ sales 
abroad.1 In addition, the provision of financial services from the 
United Kingdom might be affected, especially in the case of those 
activities that currently benefit from the European passport for 
their access to EU countries. Further, given the size and the trade 
ties of the UK economy with other countries, activity in the latter 
economies may also be expected to suffer; however, in some 
cases positive effects arising from a possible relocation of activities 
to outside the United Kingdom may arise.
Numerous papers have been written attempting to quantify the scale 
of all these effects. The impact, according to the studies, ranges 
between –1% and –6%2 of the level of UK GDP in 2018, on the basis 
of the scenario and assumptions envisaged. The consequences for 
the global economy would be on a lesser scale (–0.1% to –0.3% of 
global GDP in 2018), although there are naturally significant country-
to-country differences depending on the ties they have with the 
United Kingdom.
The result of the UK referendum on whether or not to remain in the 
EU has created a new economic and political scenario for that 
country which, given its trade and financial ties with the rest of the 
world, and especially with European countries, may ultimately 
have wider-ranging repercussions. 
In the short and medium term, it was expected that the UK economy 
would witness a tightening of financial conditions (an increase in risk 
premia and in the cost of financing, and diminished availability of 
funds), an adverse effect on asset prices (especially in the residential 
and real estate sector) and a downturn in agents’ confidence, which 
would depress domestic demand. The depreciation of sterling and 
the subsequent improvement in the competitiveness of UK-
manufactured products would enable these effects to be offset in 
part, along with a further easing in monetary policy which, at a later 
stage, might also be supported by a more expansionary fiscal policy. 
Evidently, both lower domestic demand in the United Kingdom and 
its gains in competitiveness would mean that the domestic output of 
the countries with the most significant trade ties with the UK would 
undergo a downward adjustment. 
Over a longer-dated horizon, the effects on UK productive capacity 
are more difficult to anticipate since they largely depend on the 
trade and financial arrangements that the UK may ultimately agree 
to not only with the EU but also with other major economic areas 
such as the United States or the Asian economies. In any event, an 
appear to point to greater dynamism in the second half of the year. Even in the case of the 
United Kingdom, confidence indicators appear to have recouped some of their losses 
following the referendum and the short-term economic impact appears to be less acute 
than expected. That said, the effects of the uncertainty surrounding the ultimate exit from 
the EU and the new framework of relations to be set in the future have led to a downward 
revision of expected growth in the United Kingdom in the coming years, and more 
marginally so in the economies with the closest links to the UK economy (see Box 1.1).
BOX 1.1THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM’S EXIT FROM THE EU ON FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
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1  The fall in trade may already be discernible in the short term, insofar as 
this future loss of markets is anticipated and a re-ordering of global pro-
duction processes is initiated.
2  See IMF (2016), «Macroeconomic implications of the United Kingdom lea-
ving the European Union», UK Article IV Consultation, Selected Issues, 
June.
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Adding to this is the uncertainty over the results of and ensuing policies that may arise 
from the US presidential election, doubts over the transition process in China’s growth 
model, the potential effects on financial markets of the normalisation of US monetary 
policy, the persistence of very low inflation rates that may ultimately disanchor inflation 
expectations and, finally, various geopolitical risks. All these factors may impact, to a 
greater or lesser degree, international financial markets and global economic activity.
Weak growth, low inflation and the potential materialisation of certain adverse shocks 
suggest that the stance of monetary policies will continue to be highly accommodative, 
especially in the advanced economies, albeit with the significant exception of the United 
States, which is ahead in the cycle. Indeed, the United States is expected to continue with 
the process of rises in policy interest rates, albeit at a gradual and tempered pace. In the 
rest of the main advanced economies further expansionary measures have been – or are 
expected to be – adopted. For instance, the Bank of England introduced a forceful 
quantitative easing package at its August meeting in response to the referendum result, 
including a cut in its policy interest rate to 0.25%, a term funding scheme and an increase 
in asset purchases, including a new private bond purchase programme. Meantime, the 
Bank of Japan made significant changes to its monetary policy strategy following the 
assessment of its programmes. Specifically, the new strategy is based on two pillars: 
control of the yield curve slope and the commitment to inflation overshooting, which 
entails expanding the monetary base until inflation exceeds its target (2%) and holds 
above it in a stable fashion.
The accommodative monetary policy stance and the activism of central banks is one of 
the factors that may lie behind the swift recovery, or indeed the lack of a reaction by 
international financial markets to the emergence of various sources of uncertainty during 
this period (see Chart 1.2). This is in contrast to the first half of the year when the fall in oil 
Against this background, 
the monetary policy 
stance remains highly 
accommodative,…
… prompting favourable 
performance on most financial 
markets,…
with the appointment of a new Government, which has entered into 
a lengthy process to see Brexit through, while the Bank of England 
implemented various stimulus measures. This situation was 
accompanied, as discussed in the main text, by expectations of 
more accommodative monetary policies over a longer period of time 
in most countries. That made for some recovery in the appetite for 
risk and the search for yield. Indeed, most stock market indices 
have already exceeded their pre-referendum levels, with the 
exception of UK and European bank share prices, which have not 
yet fully turned around. On the foreign exchange markets there 
was a partial correction of the depreciation sterling had undergone 
and a normalisation of market volatility, which had increased 
extraordinarily in the pre-referendum period and in the days 
immediately following it.
In any event, and despite the subsequent recovery in markets, 
doubts over how Brexit will unfold and the economic and financial 
effects arising from it remain latent. Accordingly, it cannot be ruled 
out that, as negotiations advance and the effects of this decision 
on variables such as investment and capital flows come to light, 
further episodes of volatility or corrections on financial markets 
may arise.
The initial reaction of the markets to the referendum result shows how 
unexpected it was and the numerous uncertainties it poses. Hence, 
in the two market sessions after the referendum there were across-
the-board increases in risk aversion and a flight to quality in respect 
of assets, which specifically saw a fall in the yields on the main 
sovereign benchmarks, including UK debt, and generalised declines 
in stock market indices, in particular in the euro area and the United 
Kingdom (the EURO STOXX 50 index fell by 11.2% and the FTSE 250 
by 13.7%). The reaction in the United States and Japan was more 
contained, as was the case with the FTSE 100 index, made up of 
companies with a greater weight of international activity and of sales 
in foreign markets. The stock market indices for the banking sector 
reacted very negatively, especially in the case of European banks (the 
EURO STOXX banks index posted a 23% fall). There was also a 
strong impact on UK banks, whose share prices underwent an 
average fall of 32.3%, although banks such as HSBC and Standard 
Chartered, which have a considerable volume of business outside the 
United Kingdom, were much less affected. In the case of the US 
banks, the effect on their share prices was much smaller.
Following this initial turmoil, market reaction was framed in a setting 
which saw a lessening of political uncertainty in the United Kingdom 
BOX 1.1THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM’S EXIT FROM THE EU ON FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (cont´d)
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prices and the financial tensions relating to China translated into greater sensitivity and 
rises in volatility in the face of negative news (see the May 2016 FSR), although these risks 
were also of a more systemic nature.
This relative stability and the reductions in risk premia on financial markets are fairly 
extensive to all financial assets and economic areas. Thus, stock market indices have risen 
across the board (indeed, the US S&P index posted all-time highs) and volatility, in variable-
yield and fixed-income instruments and on foreign exchange markets alike, is at very low 
levels. There have also been across-the-board falls in US junk bond yields and in spreads 
SOURCES: Datastream, Bloomberg, New York Federal Reserve and Banco de España.
a 3-month average volatilities for dollar/euro, dollar/sterling and yen/dollar.
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKET INDICATORS CHART 1.2
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
Jan-16 Mar-16 May-16 Jul-16 Sep-16
 BRAZIL-BOVESPA  TURKEY-ISE
 FTSE 250
A  STOCK EXCHANGE INDICES
01.01.2016=100 UK Referendum 
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Jan-13 Jul-13 Jan-14 Jul-14 Jan-15 Jul-15 Jan-16 Jul-16
 10-YEAR BOND  TERM PREMIUM
%
E  USA: 10-YEAR BOND INTEREST RATE AND TERM PREMIUM
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Jan-16 Mar-16 May-16 Jul-16 Sep-16
 HIGH-YIELD BOND MINUS USA 10Y GOVERNMENT BOND
 INVESTMENT GRADE BOND MINUS USA 10Y GOVERNMENT BOND
 EMBI GLOBAL (right-hand scale)
B  CORPORATE SPREADS. USA AND EMBI GLOBAL
% UK Referendum bp
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Jan-16 Mar-16 May-16 Jul-16 Sep-16
 USA  UNITED KINGDOM  JAPAN
C  SOVEREIGN DEBT 10Y YIELD
% UK Referendum 
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Jan-16 Mar-16 May-16 Jul-16 Sep-16
 EXCHANGE RATE (a)  STOCK MARKETS (VIX INDEX)
 BONDS (MOVE INDEX)
D  IMPLICIT VOLATILITY INDICES
01.01.2016=100 UK Referendum
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Jan-13 Jul-13 Jan-14 Jul-14 Jan-15 Jul-15 Jan-16 Jul-16
 2Y2Y  5Y5Y
%
F  USA: INFLATION EXPECTATIONS  - Prob(Inf<2)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2016
of emerging markets’ debt, among other indicators. These developments have come about 
against the backdrop of weaker-than-expected growth and of downward revisions to 
business profitability prospects, which suggests that factors linked to lower discount rates 
and/or greater investor risk appetite must have played a greater role in recent developments.
Long-term government debt yields also fell across the board, particularly sharply so in the 
United Kingdom as a result of the effects of the referendum outcome and the measures 
implemented by the Bank of England. Behind these movements are not only a decline in 
long-term inflation expectations but also a fall in term premia.
In the case of the banking sector, share prices have remained sensitive to market doubts 
over the outlook for the industry’s profitability. And this in a setting in which bank margins 
are going to be pressured by the environment of low interest rates, the flattening of yield 
curves, the significant volume of non-productive assets, the weak economic growth 
outlook, greater regulatory requirements and heightening competition from other agents. 
The compression of long-term debt yields is particularly affecting institutional investors 
such as pension funds and insurers. Finally, the reform of US money market funds has 
prompted tensions in the Libor and in the cost of dollar funding for international banks. 
This reform, which came into force in October this year, is designed to minimise the risk of 
investor flight from these funds in crisis periods and to increase their transparency, and is 
confined to the prime money market funds.1 Nonetheless, apart from these discrete 
movements, it would not appear likely that other money markets will be affected.
The emerging markets progressively stabilised following the turbulence early in the year, 
and recent months have been marked by a clearly positive performance, with significant 
stock market rises, an across-the-board appreciation in currencies and the compression 
of sovereign and corporate debt spreads, against the background of a return of capital 
flows towards the emerging economies.
The aforementioned global factors have been key determinants here, but so too have 
other, more specific factors such as the stabilisation of Chinese financial markets and the 
political developments in Brazil.
Quantitatively, the outlook for the emerging economies is not very different from the situation 
depicted in the previous FSR; qualitatively, however, there appears to be a change in 
sentiment which, should it persist, might ultimately translate into an improved growth 
outlook. In this respect, the emerging Asian economies saw, in the main, a bigger increase 
in GDP in Q2; in China growth stabilised, albeit underpinned by a strong increase in credit. 
In Latin America it appears that the cycle of monetary policy tightening has reached its end, 
and moderate growth was posted except in Argentina and Brazil, which are still in recession.
The higher-frequency indicators in Brazil suggest that activity might stabilise in the coming 
quarters. Indeed, 2017 might be the first year since 2014 in which Brazil grows. However, 
this forecast hinges crucially on fiscal credibility being regained. The executive has 
proposed a series of fundamental measures to ensure the sustainability of public finances, 
but these must be set in train without delay. Moreover, this would be accompanied by a 
gradual fiscal adjustment in the short term.
1  Prime money market funds are a type of US investment fund that invests mainly in financial and non-financial 
institutions’ short-term debt securities. The reform measures affect these vehicles although certain measures, 
such as the freeze imposed on reimbursements or liquidity commissions during periods of turbulence, may be 
applied voluntarily by the funds that invest mainly in government-issued assets.
… although banking sector 
stocks continue to perform 
less favourably
The search-for-yield maxim 
has also spread to emerging 
markets…
… set against some 
improvement in the 
economic outlook…
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During this period, a new source of uncertainty arose in connection with the political 
situation in Turkey, following the failed coup on 15 July. While the Turkish financial markets 
appear to have stabilised following the initial impact, uncertainty has increased concerning 
the Turkish economy which, despite performing relatively favourably in recent years, 
continues to evidence a series of imbalances and vulnerabilities. These include most 
notably a high current account deficit, the financing of which is highly sensitive to changes 
in market sentiment.
Initially, the European financial markets were, in comparative terms, greatly affected by the 
UK referendum result, although subsequently they recovered fairly quickly (see Box 1.1 
and Chart 1.3). Some of the factors that help explain this improvement are the response 
by the Bank of England, a less-than-initially-expected macroeconomic impact and the 
market’s expectation that interest rates would hold at low levels globally for a lengthy 
period.
Recent market developments have been characterised by an increase in stock market prices 
and a decline in fixed-income volatility and yields (see Chart 1.3). On the Spanish public debt 
market, 10-year bond yields stand at around 1.1%, meaning that the spread over the related 
German counterpart is at its lowest levels since spring 2015 (at around 100 bp). In private-
sector securities a significant decline has been observed in issuance costs, which has been 
more marked in the case of those issued by non-financial corporations. This decline has 
been boosted by the Eurosystem’s corporate securities purchase programme (CSPP), which 
was announced in March and launched in June.2 
In the case of bank securities, whose valuations were initially greatly affected by the UK 
referendum result, the subsequent recovery has also been notable. That said, they are still 
at low levels, both when comparing their book value and in relation to mid-2015 records 
(from early July 2015 to end-October 2016 the EURO STOXX banks index posted a 
cumulative loss of 32%, see Chart 1.3.C). Investor concerns over the outlook for the sector 
are also manifest in the high sensitivity of valuations to sector-related news, as observed 
following the EBA’s publication in late July 2016 of the stress test results.
The habitual indicators suggest that, on average, listed share prices are not misaligned in 
respect of their past relationship to other magnitudes such as business profits. Hence 
cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratios (PER), both in the case of euro area stock markets 
as a whole and in that of Spain individually, are currently at lower levels than those of their 
historical averages (see Chart 1.3.E). The credit risk premia on public and private fixed-
income securities stand, in general, at around their lowest levels in recent years, but above 
pre-crisis ones. Conversely, sovereign debt yield curve slopes are below their historical 
average, especially those of higher-rated assets (see Chart 1.3.F). This latter development 
is largely the outcome of the Eurosystem’s asset purchase programme and of highly 
expansionary monetary policies globally.
Despite the current, relative stability of financial markets, the future course of asset prices 
is conditional upon the potential changes in agents’ expectations or in their attitude to risk, 
especially in a setting in which the valuations of certain instruments have risen to their 
highest levels in recent years. Thus, for example, a potential materialisation of certain 
geopolitical risks, a downturn in the macroeconomic outlook or possible market doubts 
2  See Box 4 of the “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy” in the Banco de España’s September 2016 Economic 
Bulletin.
…although the challenges 
facing the economic 
authorities are most 
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over the capacity of economic policies to contribute to economic growth and to the 
recovery of inflation rates consistent with their medium-term references, might lead to a 
correction of share prices. That might translate into a tightening of financing conditions for 
the different sectors and into losses in investor financial portfolios.
The quarter-on-quarter growth of GDP in the euro area in Q2 was down on the related 
figure three months earlier (0.3%, against 0.5% in Q1); however, over the first six months 
a whole, the rate of increase was the same as in the second half of the previous year. The 
1.3  The macroeconomic 
environment in the 
euro area and in Spain
SOURCES: Banco de España, Bloomberg and Datastream.
a The cyclically adjusted PER is calculated as the ratio of share price to 10-year moving average earnings. The dotted lines represent the historical averages of 
the series from 02.01.2005.
b Difference between the 10-year and the 3-month rate. The dotted lines represent the historical averages of the series from 01.01.2001.
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latest projections published by the ECB (in September 2016) point to the continuity of this 
sustained but modest pattern of growth over the next two years, with rates of expansion 
of around 1.6% year-on-year (see Chart 1.4.A). In relation to projections six months earlier, 
the current forecast entails an upward revision of 0.3 pp in the growth estimated for the 
current year, but a downward revision of 0.1 pp and 0.2 pp, respectively, for 2017 and 
2018. This downward revision in the coming years is chiefly in response to the impact on 
euro area external demand of the United Kingdom’s situation following the referendum 
outcome last June.
Against this backdrop, prices in the euro area, measured by the Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices (HICP), rose slightly (to 0.4% year-on-year in September, the latest 
figure available). This trend is expected to continue in the final stretch of this year and 
early next year as a result of the base effect of the fall in oil prices in 2015 and early 2016. 
Core inflation, which excludes unprocessed food and energy, is holding at somewhat 
higher levels (0.8% over the May-September period), but is also clearly below the ECB’s 
medium-term reference for price increases (a rate of inflation below but close to 2%). The 
latest ECB projections point to an average increase in prices of 1.3% in 2017 and 1.6% 
in 2018.
The risks of GDP trending more unfavourably than reflected in this baseline scenario 
continue to be greater than those tilting in the opposite direction. Firstly, the expected 
pick-up in the global economy continues to be uncertain. Further, both globally and within 
the euro area, there is significant geopolitical uncertainty that may give rise to adverse 
shocks to the area’s economy. Most notable among those most directly affecting the euro 
area are the negotiations to be held for the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU, the various 
upcoming elections in certain countries, migratory issues and the incidence of terrorism on 
agents’ confidence.
The ECB, following its expansionary measures last December and March, has kept its 
monetary policy unchanged. It has, however, reiterated its expectations that policy interest 
rates will hold at their current or at lower levels for a prolonged period of time, further 
confirming the maintenance of the unconventional asset purchase measures until March 
2017 at least, or later if necessary, and revealing its readiness to use all the instruments 
available to it under its mandate to ensure the return of inflation to levels consistent with 
its medium-term objective.
A baseline scenario entailing a 
sustained but modest 
recovery for the euro area has 
been confirmed
With low inflation rates, that are 
expected to rise in the coming 
months, but which would hold 
in 2017 and 2018 still below the 
ECB reference level
Risks of a more adverse trend 
of GDP than that reflected in 
the baseline scenario persist
Against this background, 
the Eurosystem kept its 
expansionary monetary 
policy unchanged
SOURCES: INE, Eurostat and Banco de España.
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In the first half of the current year Spanish GDP proved stronger than expected, posting a 
quarter-on-quarter growth rate of 0.8% in both Q1 and Q2, in line with the rates observed 
in the second half of 2015 (see Chart 1.4.B). While the flash estimate on Q3 also points to 
growth only marginally lower than that indicated (0.7%), the latest Banco de España 
projections (September 2016) continued to augur a slowdown in the next two years. This 
deceleration would be mainly underpinned by the tailing off of some of the expansionary 
impulses from 2015 and 2016, associated with the fall in oil prices, the significant 
improvement in financing conditions and the depreciation of the euro, as well as the 
expansionary fiscal policy stance. Accordingly, in 2016 as a whole, the increase in GDP is 
expected to be 3.2% (the same rate as the previous year), subsequently posting rates of 
2.3% and 2.1%, respectively, in 2017 and 2018.
The year-on-year rate of change in consumer prices in Spain has returned to positive 
values, moving from –1.1% in March this year to 0.3% in September. This trend is expected 
to continue, meaning that year-on-year rates should continue to rise gradually over the 
coming months. Behind these developments, as is the case in the euro area, are the base 
effects of the previous falls in energy prices and also some recovery in the core components 
of inflation (the CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy), derived from the forecast 
progressive closing of the output gap.
In the housing market, a scenario of moderately rising prices (3.9% year-on-year in Q2, 
according to the latest information from INE) and a pick-up in activity, both in terms of 
property transactions and of investment, appears to be firming. This is in a setting in which 
there is still a supply-side overhang (albeit a diminishing one) and in which demand is 
being driven by the economic recovery and favourable financial conditions.
The financial position of Spanish households and non-financial corporations has continued 
to improve, on the whole, over recent months. The increase in income received and the 
reduction in the volumes of debt incurred led the debt ratios of both sectors to continue on 
their declining path, and they now stand close (in terms of GDP) to average euro area 
figures and notably below the highs reached during the crisis. At the same time, the current, 
exceptionally favourable financial conditions translate into historically low financial burden 
levels for both sectors. Lastly, total household net worth is also expected – on the latest 
available information – to have increased at a year-on-year rate of 1% in June this year.
In the public sector, the debt/GDP ratio rose from 99.8% to 101% in the first six months of 
the current year, interrupting the marginally declining trend of the second half of the 
previous year (see Chart 1.5). Nonetheless, the financial burden as a percentage of GDP, 
assisted by low financing costs, has been diminishing since early 2015. Further to the non-
fulfilment of the budget deficit target set for 2015 in Spain, the European Commission 
reviewed our country’s situation and decided not to impose a fine, while it put back two 
years (to 2018) the objective of attaining a deficit below 3% of GDP.
The favourable performance of the balance of goods and services and of that of income 
has enabled a net lending capacity to be maintained, a capacity that is even expected to 
have risen in the first half of the year.3 Even so, Spain’s net debtor position vis-à-vis the 
external sector (the net international investment position) remains, on information to 2016 
Q2, at a high level (of 88.5% of GDP, compared with 89.9% at the close of 2015).
3  On still-provisional data, the cumulative 12-month figure is estimated to have risen from €22 billion in December 
2015 to €26 billion in July 2016.
Spanish GDP retained its 
marked dynamism in recent 
quarters, although a gradual 
slowdown is expected 
in 2017-2018
Inflation returned, after the 
summer, to slightly positive 
values
A scenario of moderate 
recovery in the housing 
market is taking root
The financial position of 
households and non-financial 
corporations has continued 
to improve
In the public sector, the debt 
ratio is holding at high levels
The nation’s net lending 
capacity has been on a rising 
trend, although the net debtor 
position remains high
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Overall, the Spanish economy has in the recent period shown notable strength that has 
been accompanied by significant progress in the correction of some of the imbalances 
that originated during the pre-crisis expansion and during the crisis itself. However, part of 
this favourable performance has been due to temporary phenomena. And, at the same 
time, factors of vulnerability persist, linked to the high deficit and public debt levels, and 
the nation’s sizeable financial needs vis-à-vis the external sector. As was the case six 
months ago, the assessment is that the risks of GDP trending more unfavourably than 
reflected in the baseline scenario of macroeconomic projections are more significant than 
those operating in the opposite direction. In addition to the external factors highlighted 
when analysing the euro area, the Spanish economy is exposed to domestic risks, especially 
those arising from the uncertainty surrounding the future course of economic policy and, in 
particular, the measures to be taken to comply with the budget deficit targets up to 2018 
(agreed by the European Council in August) and the structural reforms required to raise the 
economy’s potential growth rate.
Despite the favourable course 
of the Spanish economy over 
the recent period, certain 
factors of risk persist in the 
short and medium term, tied 
both to external and domestic 
constraints
SOURCES: IGAE, INE and Banco de España.
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2 BANKING RISKS, PROFITABILITY AND SOLVENCY
This chapter assesses the main risks of Spanish deposit institutions. International exposure 
is analysed first, then domestic exposure, specifically focusing on the evolution of total 
assets, the behaviour of credit and of non-performing, foreclosed and forborne assets, 
and the related non-performing loan (NPL) ratio. Subsequently, the profitability of the 
banking system and, finally, its ability to withstand the risks considered, are analysed by 
studying the solvency of Spanish deposit institutions as a whole. This study will show not 
only the current capital levels of institutions and recent developments, but will also include 
a forward-looking analysis of their solvency over three years (2016-2018) and under certain 
macroeconomic scenarios.
International exposure
The consolidated total assets of Spanish deposit institutions, including both their business 
in Spain and that of their subsidiaries and branches abroad, amounted to €3,672 billion in 
June 2016, slightly higher than in June 2015 (year-on-year growth of 0.4%, see Annex 1)1. 
This growth is the result of the development of activity abroad, with a 15.5% increase in 
total financial assets at June 2016, compared with a year earlier. In business in Spain, 
however, total financial assets decreased by 2.2% year-on-year. 
Since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008, the performance of business abroad 
continues to be positive (see Chart 2.1), driven both by greater activity and by the evolution 
of the exchange rate.
Particularly noteworthy is the relative importance of business in the United Kingdom and 
the United States (see Chart 2.2.A), which in June 2016 accounted for almost half of the 
total international exposure. The main changes in international exposures, both in relative 
and absolute terms, relate to the United Kingdom, the United States, Brazil and Turkey. 
1 Total financial assets account for more than 90% of the total balance sheet as at June 2016.
2.1 Banking risks
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Specifically, the increase in exposures in the United Kingdom and Turkey is due to the 
acquisition of a British bank and of a controlling stake in a Turkish bank by two Spanish 
deposit institutions, respectively. 
Credit exposure to the United Kingdom is restricted to three Spanish deposit institutions 
and it is mostly concentrated in lending to households (which accounts for 70% of the 
total loan portfolio in this country) and, in particular, for home purchase (see Chart 2.2.B). 
Conversely, in the United States, Europe (excluding the United Kingdom) and Latin 
America, loans to households account for a lending volume similar to that of loans to non-
financial corporations (approximately 35%-40% of the total loan portfolio).
Chart 2.3 shows the percentage changes in the exposure arising from loan portfolios of the 
main countries where the Spanish institutions conduct their business abroad,2 and the 
evolution of the exchange rates of currencies other than the euro in which such exposures 
are denominated. Specifically, the credit portfolio in the United Kingdom increased by 
9.7% year-on-year despite the appreciation of the euro against sterling (16.2%). In the 
United States, the growth of the credit portfolio (13%) was not affected by the behaviour 
of the exchange rate, since the euro depreciated only by 0.8% against the dollar. In Latin 
America, the euro rose by 3.5% against the Brazilian real and by 8.3% against the Chilean 
peso, and the credit exposure to Brazil and Chile increased by 14.1% and 6.8%, 
respectively, which more than offset, therefore, the exchange rate effect. In Mexico, credit 
exposure fell slightly (–0.4%) as a result of the appreciation of the euro against the Mexican 
peso (17.7%). In the case of Turkey, despite the 7% depreciation of the Turkish lira, 
exposure grew substantially owing to the corporate transaction of a Spanish bank in that 
country.
With regard to financing to general government at total consolidated level, Annex 1 shows 
that its weight in the balance sheet grew from 14.8% of total assets at June 2015 to 15.1% 
at June 2016, whereas the weight of private sector financing in the balance sheet decreased 
by 0.8 percentage points (pp).
2  Only growth rates for those institutions that report data both as at June 2015 and June 2016 are considered, 
except in the case of UK exposures, where the increase mainly stems from the acquisition of a British bank by a 
Spanish deposit institution.
…and, in the United Kingdom, 
it is mainly concentrated in 
lending to households for 
home purchase
The increase in credit 
exposure abroad was 
accompanied by uneven 
developments in exchange 
rates 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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With respect to lending to the public sector, in particular sovereign risk, the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) published the results of the stress test for 2016 based on data 
relating to December 20153 for the European banking sector, which enables us to analyse, 
by country, European sovereign exposure. The data, aggregated by country, show that 
the volume of sovereign exposure of European banks ranges between 2.9% and 20.4% 
of total exposure (see Chart 2.4.A).4 The percentage of sovereign exposure at Spanish 
banks is similar to the European average (13% for Spain and 11.5% for European banks 
as a whole). 
3  The results of the EBA stress test for 2016, on a sample of 51 of Europe’s biggest banks, are available at http://www.
eba.europe.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-stress-testing/2016/results, and are analysed in detail in Box 2.4
4  Exposure to sovereign risk was calculated using the net direct position as defined by EBA methodology for stress 
tests. The total exposure relates to the total value of credit exposures (on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet 
across all exposure categories for the purpose of calculating risk-weighted assets), also as defined by the EBA. 
The percentage of sovereign 
exposure at Spanish 
institutions is similar to the 
European average… 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The growth rate of the Turkish loan portfolio between June 2015 and June 2016 was 299%.
b Change in the exposure of deposit institutions that report data, both June 2015 and June 2016, except in the case of the United Kingdom where the increase 
stems from the acquisition of a British bank by a Spanish deposit institition.
c A positive (negative) value in growth rate means an appreciation (depreciation) of the euro against foreign currency.
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As regards the geographical distribution of sovereign exposure by issuing country,5 the 
volume of domestic exposures between countries is highly dispersed, ranging between 
19.4% (Finland) and 99.3% (Poland) (see Chart 2.4.B). In Spain, domestic exposure as a 
proportion of total sovereign exposure (56.9%) exceeds the average for European banks 
(47.8%), but is similar to that of the major EU economies (57.5% in Germany, 55.2% in 
France and 58.8% in Italy).
5 Domestic sovereign exposure as a percentage of total sovereign exposure.
…and the proportion of 
domestic exposure is similar 
to that of German, French or 
Italian banks 
SOURCE: EBA.
a The comparison is made for the 51 institutions which participate in EBA 2016 stress test. Each point on the chart represents the country data indicated next to 
that point in reference to its activity in the country according to the colour of the legend.
b NPL ratio in Cyprus and Greece is 47.4% and 46.9%, respectively. NPL ratio change in Ireland is -6.9 pp.
c June 2015 data not available for the following countries: Slovenia, Malta and Estonia.
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Non-performing loans
Non-performing loans at consolidated level continued to decline during the first half of 
2016. Specifically, the year-on-year change at June 2016 was –13.7%, similar to that 
observed at December 2015, which means that consolidated non-performing loans 
decreased by more than €24 billion in the past year. This led to a substantial decline in the 
weight of non-performing loans in total assets at Spanish institutions, from 4.9% at June 
2015 to 4.2% at June 2016. 
The NPL ratio for loans at consolidated level of Spanish deposit institutions declined by 
0.9 pp to 5% in June 2016. In the case of loans to the private sector, the NPL ratio fell 
from 7.8% in June 2015 to 6.7% in June 2016. The NPL ratios associated with lending in 
the two countries in which Spanish banks have a large exposure, the United Kingdom and 
the United States, stand below 2%. Only in Portugal, Turkey and the United States has 
the NPL ratio increased, albeit by less than 1 pp (0.1 pp in the United States), whereas it 
fell in all the other countries (see Chart 2.5.A). 
Using the results of the 2016 stress test published by the EBA, based on data relating to 
December 2015, an estimate can be obtained of the NPL ratio by means of the ratio of 
exposures in default6 in countries in which Spanish deposit institutions concentrate their 
activity abroad and, thus, it can be compared with those of other European countries 
whose banks also maintain exposures to such countries. This analysis was carried out in 
connection with the bank exposures of Spain, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy 
and the Netherlands (those with a greater international exposure) to the United Kingdom, 
the United States, Mexico, Brazil and Turkey. In the case of Spain, the ratio of exposures 
in default stands, in general, below the average for the countries considered. Chart 2.5.B 
shows the ratios of exposures in default, together with the value of total exposures located 
in such countries.
At the European level, as at June 2016 a significant dispersion in the NPL ratio of the loan 
portfolio (which ranges from 1% in Sweden to 47% in Cyprus, see Chart 2.5.C),7 and a 
reduction in the ratio relative to June 2015 in most European countries, can be observed. 
In Spain, the aggregate NPL ratio for the major Spanish deposit institutions decreased 
from 7.1% in June 2015 to 6% a year later (1.1 pp less), as compared with 5.5% at the 
European level (a decline of 0.5 pp).
Domestic exposure
As at June 2016, lending to the resident private sector in business in Spain, analysed using 
the individual balance sheets of institutions, fell by 4.7% year-on-year. This fall is slightly 
higher than that observed at June 2015 year-on-year (–4.5%) (see Chart 2.6.A). However, 
the reason for this worsening is the behaviour of lending to financial corporations 
(investment funds, insurance companies, pension funds and other financial institutions 
other than monetary financial institutions), which declined sharply between June 2015 and 
June 2016. If only the household and non-financial corporation sectors are taken into 
account, lending decreased at June 2016 by 3.1%, a considerably more moderate fall than 
6  The exposure in default ratio is calculated as the ratio of exposure in default to total exposure, considering the 
value of exposure as that used to calculate risk weighted assets as defined by the COREP (see https://www.boe.
es/doue/2014/191/L00001-01861.pdf).
7  These data relate to a sample of 198 banks, and are available at: http:/www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-
data/risk-dashboard.
Non-performing loans at 
consolidated level fell by 
13.7% in the past year,…
…the NPL ratio reaching 5% 
The ratio of exposures in 
default in countries where 
Spanish banks have higher 
exposure is lower than the 
average for the major 
European countries with 
exposures to such countries 
Excluding financial 
corporations, lending to the 
resident private sector in the 
case of business in Spain 
continued to fall, albeit at 
more moderate rates
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at June 2015 (–5.3%). Chart 2.6.B shows the dispersion of institutions as regards the 
change in lending to households and non-financial corporations. The dispersion persisted 
between June 2015 and June 2016, and the distribution as a whole shifted to the right 
(lower rates of decline in lending). The latest monthly data available, relating to July 2016, 
show a continuation of the trend observed, reducing the year-on-year fall to 4.6%.
As mentioned above, Chart 2.6.A shows the rates of change in lending by institutional 
sector and branch of activity. A lower decline can be observed from mid-2014 for all 
sectors and branches. Lending to non-financial corporations fell by 3.6% year-on-year at 
June 2016, as compared with a decline of 5.7% observed a year earlier. The decline in 
lending to households also slowed down, with a 2.7% fall at June 2016, as compared with 
the –4.9% change at June 2015. 
By industry (see Chart 2.6.A), the decline in lending for construction and real estate 
activities was significantly tempered in the past year. At June 2016 the fall was 9.7%, as 
against 14.9% a year earlier. Lending to firms engaging in business other than construction 
This moderation is observed 
for both households and non-
financial corporations…
…and, among the latter, more 
significantly in lending to 
construction and real estate 
activities 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Includes securitisations.
b The graph shows the density function (or frenquency distribution) of the year-on-year rate of change of credit for deposit institutions. This density function 
is approximated through a kernel estimator which allows a non-parametric estimate of the density function, yielding a continuous and smoothed graphical 
representation of that function.
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and real estate continued to decline at much more moderate rates (–0.5% at June 2016, 
substantially unchanged in the past year). However, differences in behaviour by sector 
were observed (see Chart 2.6.C), with notable growth in agriculture, animal production, 
forestry and fishing (6.1% in lending in the past year), and moderate decreases in lending 
to services other than real estate activities (–1.5%). 
By size, of the total lending to the resident private sector, lending to SMEs declined by 
4.2% year-on-year at June 2016, a sharper fall than a year earlier (–0.2% at June 2015). 
Meanwhile, the decline in lending to large firms was substantially more moderate. Thus, at 
June 2015 the rate of decline year-on-year was 13.1%, as compared with 3.6% a year 
later. Accordingly, of the total lending to non-financial corporations, the weight of lending 
to SMEs decreased slightly from 52.5% at June 2016 to 52.1% a year later. Finally, lending 
to sole proprietors, which increased its weight in total lending to non-financial corporations 
(from 8.1% to 8.4%), grew at a rate of 0.9% year-on-year (as against a decline of 0.9% at 
June 2015). In any event, the high variability observed in these series makes it difficult to 
accurately assess the behaviour of lending by firm size.
The decline in year-on-year lending to households slowed down owing to the more 
moderate fall in loans for house purchase, specifically declining by 3.5% at June 2016, 
against –5.3% a year earlier. Lending to households for other purposes (basically consumer 
credit) posted positive rates of change (2.1%) for the first time, in general, since the onset 
of the crisis. This increase in consumer credit coincides with the favourable performance of 
this GDP component and with the interest of banks in lending at more profitable rates.
With respect to lending to households for house purchase, it is useful to analyse the 
behaviour in the last few years of the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, i.e. the ratio of the 
outstanding balance of the loan to the appraised value of the property used as collateral. 
In the last five years, the percentage of mortgage loans whose LTV ratio exceeds 80%, i.e. 
the proportion of lending with a higher risk outstanding, has remained relatively consistent 
at around 15% (see Chart 2.7.A). Also, the average LTV ratio8 using data as at June 2016 
is 57.1% and in the last five years it has remained stable between 57% and 58%. The 
decrease in real estate prices (see Chart 2.12.B) from 2011 to 2014 was accompanied by 
a contraction of mortgage lending (LTV numerator), which has kept the LTV ratios stable 
(see Chart 2.7.A). Also, the distribution of mortgage lending to households for house 
purchase by institutions on the basis of their average LTV ratio has hardly changed between 
December 2011 and December 2015 and most of the average LTV at those dates ranged 
between 45% and 70% (see Chart 2.7.B). 
The approval rate of the loans to non-financial corporations starting a new relationship with 
a bank has remained stable since mid-2015. This is due to a higher increase in requests 
than in loan approvals, although the two figures show stable year-on-year growth. By 
business line (construction and real estate and other firms), approval rate levels are similar.
Interest rates on new loans by Spanish deposit institutions continued in the past year on 
the moderate downward path initiated in 2014, reflecting a relative improvement in credit 
conditions available to households and non-financial corporations (see Chart 2.7.D). The 
difference between the interest rates charged to non-financial corporations on new loans, 
depending on the size of the loan, continued to decline, owing to the larger reduction in 
rates on smaller loans.
8  See the footnote to Chart 2.7.A for the average LTV calculation.
The decline in lending to 
SMEs increased and the 
decline in lending to large 
firms decreased… 
…while all types of lending to 
households improved 
The percentage of mortgage 
lending with high and average 
LTV ratios has remained 
relatively stable in recent years
The approval rates for lending 
to non-financial corporations 
remained stable last year…
…and interest rates continued 
the downward trend of recent 
years
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Troubled assets
As regards the impact of credit risk, non-performing loans continued to decrease between 
June 2015 and June 2016. Specifically, the year-on-year rate of change of these assets 
was –18.2%, somewhat lower than that seen a year earlier (–19.8%) and, most notably, 
lower than those of recent months (–22.3% at December 2015 or –22.5% at March 2016). 
In any event, as Chart 2.8.A depicts, the fall in non-performing loans was very sharp in the 
last few years, with the total volume of such assets decreasing by more than €73 billion 
from December 2013 to June 2016, an accumulated decline of more than 38%.
By institutional sector and industry (see Chart 2.8.B), non-performing loans decreased in 
the past year, both in households and in non-financial corporations, albeit with differing 
intensity. Noteworthy in the case of households was the deceleration of non-performing 
Non-performing loans 
continued to fall in the past 
year…
…with differing intensity but 
broad-based across...
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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loans in consumer credit, which fell at June 2016 by 12.3% year-on-year, as against an 
18.2% drop a year earlier. Conversely, non-performing loans in credit for activities other 
than real estate and construction (other lines of business) accelerated their rate of decline 
in the past year, which fell by 11.7% at June 2015 year-on-year and by 18.2% at June 2016.
Chart 2.8.C shows the distribution of the rate of change of non-performing loans by 
institution. As can be observed, the decrease in non-performing loans was the norm 
among institutions. Additionally, in the past year there was a greater concentration of 
institutions in similar rates of change, which points to a more consistent behaviour than in 
the preceding year. Notably, of total non-performing loans, in June 2016 45% related to 
lending to SMEs, while 26% of the total related to all other non-financial corporations. 
Also, the weight of non-performing loans in lending to households for house purchase and 
other purposes as a percentage of the total was 20% and 7%, respectively. Lastly, 2% 
related to non-performing loans in lending to financial corporations (see Chart 2.8.D). 
The reduction in non-performing loans was seen in all firm size categories (see Chart 
2.9.A). Declines were sharper among SMEs, which reduced non-performing loans by 
22.7% year-on-year, accelerating the fall from 14.8% observed at June 2015. In the case 
...institutional sectors, 
industries… 
...and also across institutions
The decrease in non-
performing loans was greater 
in SMEs than in other firms…
NPLs. RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR
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of large firms and sole proprietors, the rates of decline in non-performing loans decreased 
in the past year. 
By sector of activity, among SMEs, real estate and construction activities recorded the 
most significant decline in non-performing loans at June 2016 (–26.7%). The remaining 
sectors recorded a more moderate aggregate decline of 16.7% in year-on-year terms (see 
Chart 2.9.B). These developments gave rise to a change in the distribution of non-
performing loans among SMEs in the past year, with a reduction of the weight of loans to 
construction and real estate activities (see Chart 2.9.C). Nevertheless, the weight of non-
performing loans in this sector continues to be greater for SMEs than for other non-
financial corporations (see Chart 2.9.D).
New non-performing loans in the resident private sector (non-financial corporations and 
households) in 2016 Q2 decreased by 36.1%, as compared with those classified as non-
performing in 2015 Q2 (see Chart 2.10.A). The decrease in new non-performing loans of 
non-financial corporations was recorded both for SMEs (–33.9% in Q2 in year-on-year 
terms) and for large corporations (–42.7%, see Chart 2.10.B). 
Charts 2.10.C. and D enable the behaviour of non-performing loans and their inflows and 
outflows in the first half of 2015 and 2016, respectively, to be compared. The decrease in 
the absolute value of non-performing loans was smaller in the first half of 2016, despite 
...especially in construction 
and real estate activities
In the first half of 2016 
there was a decrease in new 
non-performing loans and a 
lower volume of recoveries 
with respect to a year earlier
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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the lower new non-performing loans. Specifically, the weight of new non-performing 
loans in existing non-performing loans was 11.8% in 2016 H1, as compared with 13.4% 
in 2015 H1. The volume of transfers to write-offs was slightly lower in 2016 H1 (8.1%) 
than in 2015 (8.4%). Lastly, recoveries of non-performing loans were lower in 2016 
(12.7%) than in 2015 (18.6%).
In relative terms, the NPL ratio of the resident private sector in Spain continued to decline 
in the past year (see Chart 2.11.A), because the decrease in non-performing loans 
(numerator) was sharper than the fall in total credit (denominator). The ratio stood at 9.7% 
in June 2016, 1.6 pp lower than a year earlier. As regards the year-on-year change in the 
NPL ratio (see Chart 2.11.B), not one month of growth has been recorded since it began to 
decline in 2015. However, a slowdown in the decline in the NPL ratio has been observed in 
the first half of 2016. 
By institutional sector and branch of activity, the NPL ratios of both households and non-
financial corporations decreased (see Chart 2.11.C). In the case of households, the ratio fell 
by 0.7 pp between June 2015 and June 2016 to 5.2%. The decline occurred both in the 
NPL ratio for loans for house purchase (–0.5 pp, to 4.5%) and for other loans (–1.3 pp, to 
8.7%). The NPL ratio of non-financial corporations also decreased, in this case by 3.2 pp, 
to 15.7%. The greatest decline arose in construction and real estate activities as a whole, 
reaching an NPL ratio of 27.6% after falling 4.1 pp in 2016. The ratio for other sectors 
decreased by 2.3 pp to 10.4%. By firm size, the most significant decrease in the NPL ratio 
The resident private sector 
NPL ratio continued to decline 
in the past year…
…and did so across all 
institutional sectors, loan 
types and firm size categories
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related to SMEs (–3.5 pp, to 20.5%), although the starting point for the ratio was substantially 
higher than for other firms. Large corporations saw their NPL ratio decline to 11.5% in June 
2016, while at sole proprietors the ratio decreased by 1 pp to 10.4% (see Chart 2.11.D). The 
decrease in the NPL ratio was the norm among institutions (see Chart 2.11.E). 
In connection with credit risk, Box 2.1 includes the main features of Banco de España Circular 
4/2016 implementing the general framework for management of credit risk and certain 
accounting matters, including credit transaction classification and provisioning estimates.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The transfers to Sareb by Group 1 and Group 2 banks in December 2012 and February 2013 affect the rates of change in those periods.
b The graph shows the density function (or frequency distribution) of the NPL ratio for Spanish deposit institutions. This density function is approximated through a 
kernel estimator which allows a non-parametric estimate of the density function, yielding a continuous and smoothed graphical representation of that function.
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NEW ANNEX IX TO BANCO DE ESPAÑA CIRCULAR 4/2004 ON ANALYSIS AND COVERAGE OF CREDIT RISK BOX 2.1
The accounting regime of Spanish credit institutions is regulated 
by Banco de España Circular 4/2004 on public and confidential 
financial reporting rules and formats. Annex IX thereto on analysis 
and coverage of credit risk establishes a general accounting 
framework for credit risk management and criteria for accounting 
classification and estimation of provisions for credit risk. 
The purpose of the amendment of Annex IX implemented by 
Banco de España Circular 4/2016 of 27 April 2016, which came 
into force on 1 October 2016, is to update Annex IX so as to 
include the most recent developments in banking regulation and 
the best practices identified in credit risk management and 
accounting. 
The update of Annex IX is part of the process to improve and 
adapt Circular 4/2004 to promote the consistent application of the 
accounting framework comprised by the international financial 
reporting standards (IFRSs) adopted by the EU. 
These improvements, which strengthen credit risk management, 
the proper classification of transactions, the appropriate treatment 
of collateral for accounting purposes and the soundness of 
provision estimates, will remain in force when IFRS 9 is adopted in 
the EU, without prejudice to the future amendment of Circular 
4/2004 to replace the current “incurred loss” accounting model by 
the “expected loss” model.
Moreover, the various components relating to credit risk accounting 
that have been subject to updating and further development are 
key to be able to advance towards robust accounting models. The 
establishment of minimum requirements to be met by the 
accounting methods used by credit institutions was provided for 
by Circular 4/2004, although it was pending implementation. In 
particular, the new Annex IX establishes requirements to guide 
both the development of own methods for individual estimates of 
specific provisions and of internal methods for collective estimates 
of specific and generic provisions.
The five most significant components are described below:
1. Criteria for accounting classification of transactions: the 
distinction between standard and doubtful exposures is 
perfectly aligned with the FINREP definitions of “performing” 
and “non-performing”. The convergence of the accounting 
treatment of forbearance with the European reporting 
standards established by the EBA is also strengthened. 
Transactions that are standard but present weaknesses 
should be classified under the new risk category as “standard 
exposures under special monitoring”, in accordance with the 
guidelines and criteria of Annex IX. This new category 
includes, inter alia, forborne exposures under probation. 
Institutions must ensure at all times that the accounting 
classification of transactions is consistent with their level of 
provisioning for credit risk.
2. Governance and internal controls: boards of directors of credit 
institutions must be closely involved in the approval of 
accounting policies, also periodically monitoring their 
implementation in accordance with the principles and 
requirements established in Annex IX. The involvement of 
boards of directors is also required for approval of the 
procedures for reporting to the Banco de España relevant 
information on internal validation, initial and periodic, of 
internal accounting methods. 
 The internal control function is also strengthened, particularly 
in connection with information systems and databases, the 
quality and consistency of which are central to develop 
methods to estimate provisions and for decision-making at all 
levels of management, including the board of directors.
3. Effectiveness and simplicity in the development of accounting 
methods: any complexity not involving an obvious improvement 
in the quality and consistency of the results obtained should be 
avoided. Accounting methodologies should not be “black 
boxes”, but should be comprehensible and offer results that 
are understandable and realistic.  For this purpose, institutions 
should establish periodic backtesting procedures to assess 
the accuracy of their provisioning estimates by comparing 
them with actual losses observed. Based on period backtesting, 
accounting methods should be fine-tuned on an ongoing basis 
to strengthen their effectiveness. As an additional support, 
periodic analyses of sensitivity and benchmarking exercises 
are required. 
4. Collateral valuation policies: institutions are required to 
assess the effectiveness of collateral in order to be considered 
in estimating provisions, based on their experience. For this 
purpose, it is key for institutions to have databases with all 
the relevant information on collateral securing transactions 
and for these databases to be revised regularly by their 
internal audit department. Annex IX establishes the 
requirements relating to procedures and to the minimum 
frequencies for updating the value of collateral in order to be 
recorded as an effective means of mitigating credit risk. 
These requirements become more stringent as the accounting 
classification of risk worsens. 
5. Principle of proportionality: in the case of institutions that have 
not developed internal methods for collective estimation of 
provisions, Annex IX offers alternative solutions (percentages 
for provisions and percentage discounts applied to the 
reference value of the collateral), calculated on the basis of 
Banco de España’s information on the sector and experience.
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The foreclosed assets, or assets received in payment of debts arising from business in 
Spain, held by Spanish banks on their balance sheets decreased by 1.4% in the past year to 
approximately €81 billion. The amount of foreclosed assets has decreased, albeit very 
moderately, in the last few years. 39% of total foreclosed assets are land, 25% are completed 
buildings and 22% are foreclosed assets arising from house purchases. Finally, buildings 
under construction accounted for 5% of the total in June 2016.
Chart 2.12.A shows the changes in recent years in the gross book value of the foreclosed 
assets, or assets received in payment of debts arising from business in Spain, recorded in 
the balance sheets of Spanish deposit institutions. Their value ranged from €85 billion to 
€81.5 billion between December 2011 and December 2015, respectively. Nonetheless, a 
more detailed analysis of these changes shows differing behaviour over the years.
Foreclosed assets decreased by €7 billion from December 2011 to December 2013, mainly 
as a result of the transfer of foreclosed assets to Sareb. The gross amount transferred 
totalled €32 billion; therefore, without these transfers, the foreclosed assets in the balance 
sheets of the institutions would have increased substantially during the more difficult years 
of the crisis. 
Foreclosed assets decreased 
by 1.4% in the past year
Although the decrease in 
foreclosed assets between 
2011 and 2013 arose from the 
transfers to Sareb…
SOURCES: Banco de España and Ministerio de Fomento.
a Shown beside each bar is the percentage each item represents of the total foreclosed assets at the beginning of the year.
b Group 1 institutions were Banco Financiero y de Ahorros, NCG Banco, Catalunya Banc (currently integrated in BBVA) y Banco de Valencia (currently integrated 
in La Caixa).
c Group 2 institutions were BMN, Liberbank, Caja3 (currently integrated in Ibercaja) and CEISS (currently integrated in Unicaja).
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This box analyses the volume of foreclosed real estate assets that 
were sold in the period 2012-2015 by Spanish deposit institutions. 
The data used in this box are taken from the inventory of foreclosed 
real estate assets in Spain in 2014 and 2015 and the annual sales 
of foreclosures during the period 2012-2015 of the institutions 
comprising the 14 groups subject to direct supervision by the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), plus from those of another 
group of less significant institutions: two savings banks, four 
banks and the credit cooperatives, i.e. practically all of Spain’s 
deposit institutions.
To facilitate the analysis, sales and inventories of foreclosed real 
estate assets have been grouped by type of asset, namely: 
SALES OF FORECLOSED ASSETS IN THE SPANISH BANKING SECTOR (2012 – 2015) BOX 2.2
In 2014 foreclosed assets increased by more than €5 billion, since new foreclosures 
recorded in the balance sheets of institutions exceeded sales. However, this trend was 
reversed in 2015 for the first time in recent years. There were sales of foreclosed assets in 
excess of €11 billion (equal to 13.7% of the stock of foreclosed assets in early 2015), 
whereas additions of new foreclosures in the balance sheets did not reach €10 billion. In 
aggregate, foreclosed assets decreased by almost €2 billion (2.1%) during 2015. 
The gradual recovery of the real estate market (see Charts 2.12.B and C) should enable 
banks to progressively reduce the amount of foreclosed assets in the next few years, 
thereby reducing the weight of these unproductive assets in their balance sheets and, 
accordingly, contributing to improve profitability. The sales of foreclosed assets in the last 
three years may be seen in greater detail in Box 2.2.
…the decrease in foreclosed 
assets in 2015 arose from 
more buoyant sales
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Blue bars in the left-hand scale show gross book value of 2014 stock, by type of asset, and the dark red diamonds in the right-hand scale shows 2015 sales as 
a percentage of the gross book value of 2014 stock.
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BOX 2.2SALES OF FORECLOSED ASSETS IN THE SPANISH BANKING SECTOR (2012 – 2015) (cont’d)
housing, commercial premises, industrial property, land and other 
real estate assets.
Chart A summarises the data for all the institutions. In 2012-2015 
sales of real estate assets of Spanish deposit institutions 
amounted to nearly €25.5 billion, with house sales accounting 
for 73% of the total (€18.6 billion). Sales of commercial premises 
and land amounted to €2.5 billion and around €2.9 billion, 
respectively. Sales of other real estate assets (property 
development items, uncategorised assets, etc.) amounted to 
approximately €1.3 billion.
Chart B shows that most of the total volume of foreclosed assets 
as at December 2014 in the balance sheets of the institutions 
relates to houses (43% of the total volume of foreclosures, 
approximately €85 billion) and land (40% of the total). However, it 
can also be seen that the proportion of housing sales in 2015 to 
inventory in 2014 exceeds the figure for land sales slightly more 
than threefold. In other words, 20% of the €37 billion of houses in 
inventory in 2014 were sold in 2015, as compared with only 6% of 
the €34 billion recorded in the balance sheet as at December 
2014, in the case of land.
Chart C analyses the volume of foreclosed sales over a longer 
period of time and shows that, on average, institutions have sold 
in 2012-2015 foreclosed assets for a value of approximately 35% 
of the inventoried value in 2015. By asset category, houses present 
the highest percentage of sales (58%) and land the lowest (12%).
Adding together non-performing loans and foreclosed assets produces a total of €199 billion 
of unproductive assets on the balance sheet as at June 2016, which do not generate revenues 
in the income statement. Total unproductive assets declined by 12% in the past year, but they 
still represent a significant proportion of banks’ total assets in their business in Spain, putting 
downward pressure on their income statement and profitability. 
The total forborne credit to the resident private sector amounted to €143.9 billion in June 
2016, after a year-on-year decline of 12.1%. This figure also reflects a continuation of the 
trend observed in recent quarters, although the year-on-year decline is somewhat more 
moderate (see Chart 2.13.A). 
Of total forborne credit, 48% was non-performing in June 2016, a reduction of 1.2 pp in the 
past year. Also, the proportion of total forborne credit classified as substandard fell from 17.7% 
in June 2015 to 15.4% a year later. As a result, the proportion of total forborne credit classified 
as performing increased in 2016 by 3.4 pp, to 36.6% in June 2016 (see Chart 2.13.B).
In total, unproductive assets 
declined by 12% in 2016, 
although they still represent 
a significant proportion 
of the assets
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In summary, ex-post credit risk, measured by means of different variables (non-performing 
loans, forborne exposures, foreclosed assets, in the form of stocks and flows), continued 
to improve since the last FSR was published, basically reflecting the stabilisation and 
improvement of economic and business activity, to which an environment of low interest 
rates contributes. In addition to the reduction of the volume of NPLs, an improvement in 
the momentum of lending is also relevant to continue on the path of declining NPL ratios. 
So far in 2016, two episodes have increased the level of the systemic risk indicator (SRI, 
see Chart 2.14.A). Firstly, at the beginning of the year and until the end of February, the 
greater uncertainty in the financial markets owing to, among other factors, lower growth 
projections, deceleration in emerging economies, low profitability of the banking business, 
more stringent regulatory requirements and other idiosyncratic elements relating to certain 
banking systems and institutions, led to downward corrections in the stock markets and a 
gradual increase in the SRI level, which fell back since then. The second episode was more 
abrupt and its cause more specific. As a result of the outcome of the United Kingdom EU 
membership referendum, in the last week of June and the first two weeks of July the SRI 
rose sharply to levels near those reached during the first episode of financial stress in early 
2016. However, since mid-July the SRI has declined, reflecting lower levels of stress in the 
system, as has occurred in other countries.
2.1.2 SYSTEMIC RISK
The SRI level rose in the early 
months of 2016 and in late 
June, but currently remains 
low
SOURCES: Datastream, ECB and Banco de España.
a For a detailed explanation of this indicator, see Box 1.1 in the May 2013 FSR.
b? ?????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????? ????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
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A CoVaR model may be used to quantify the contribution of Spanish banks to the systemic 
risk of the euro area as a whole.9 The recent average CoVaR of Spanish banks has remained 
far from the levels of systemic risk reached between 2008 and 2013 (see Chart 2.14.B). 
However, minor isolated increases can be seen in the CoVaR that relate to bouts of 
turbulence that arose in early 2016 and following the British referendum, which have 
already fallen back to lower levels. Additionally, strong volatility persists in the 5th percentile 
of the CoVaR of European banks, which shows considerable heterogeneity in the 
contribution of different European banks to systemic risk. 
Since the last FSR, euro area interbank market activity has remained very weak. Chart 2.15.A 
shows EONIA trading volume, which continued the downtrend initiated in January 2015 and 
in 2016 Q3 had fallen back to levels similar to the lows of end-2015. The Spanish interbank 
market performed similarly, with very low trading volumes in both the secured segment and 
the unsecured segment and only a minor role being played by the latter.
This lack of activity in the interbank markets is largely a consequence of the policy of 
liquidity provision by the Eurosystem through various asset purchase programmes and 
refinancing operations, the latter including a series of four targeted longer-term refinancing 
operations (TLTRO II) which began to be executed in June 2016. Chart 2.15.C shows the 
outstanding amount provided through ECB tenders, both for the Eurosystem as a whole 
and for institutions resident in Spain. It can be seen that European credit institutions, and 
Spanish ones in particular, have continued to have considerable recourse to Eurosystem 
funds and that the funding obtained has been retained by them through practically constant 
tenders during the past year. Indeed, from end-October 2015 to end-October 2016, the 
gross recourse increased for the Eurosystem as a whole by just 3.3% and decreased by 
1.5% for Spain. Consequently, the loan to Spanish institutions as a percentage of the 
Eurosystem total remained unchanged, as shown by Chart 2.15.B, which sets out the 
volume of lending allotted in tenders to institutions resident in Spain as a percentage of the 
total provided by the Eurosystem. Specifically, in September 2016 the share of funds 
allotted to institutions resident in Spain stood at an average of 25.5%. However, this share 
becomes less and less representative as the Eurosystem purchase programme proceeds, 
because the relative importance of refinancing operations is decreasing. In fact, the 
liquidity provided by this latter mechanism, somewhat more than €500 billion, is 
approximately half of the amount provided by the Eurosystem through the purchase 
programme. 
Regarding longer-term funding, in the first three quarters of 2016 Spanish deposit 
institutions have issued almost €8 billion of senior debt and more than €11 billion of 
covered bonds, while subordinated debt issues eligible as Tier 1 capital (AT1) and Tier 2 
capital (T2) has been much more limited (see Chart 2.15.D). Issuance activity was 
concentrated in the first quarter of the year and decreased from then on, while financing 
conditions, as seen in Chart 2.15.E, improved during the year.
Relative to the first three quarters of last year, there was a slight increase in senior debt 
issuance and a decrease in covered bond issuance. Overall, the total issuance of these 
two types of debt declined with respect to 2015. 
At consolidated level, private sector deposits grew by 1.9% at June 2016 in comparison 
with the same month of 2015, mainly due to the positive performance of business abroad, 
9 For an explanation of the CoVaR model, see the May 2015 FSR.
 2.1.3 FUNDING RISK
Euro area interbank market 
activity remained very weak...
…against the background of 
the policy of liquidity provision 
by the Eurosystem 
In the first three quarters 
of 2016, the amount of senior 
debt and covered bond 
issuance decreased with 
respect to the same period 
of 2015
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where these deposits were up by 10.7% (see Chart 2.16). Particularly noteworthy is the 
relative importance of business in the UK and the USA (see Chart 2.17.A), which in June 
2016 represented more than one-third of deposits abroad. Further, in the UK, Europe 
(excluding the UK) and the USA, the retail deposits taken by Spanish deposit institutions 
come mainly from households (especially in the UK, where deposits from households make 
up 73.4% of total deposits), and to a lesser extent from non-financial corporations. By 
contrast, in Latin America the proportions of total deposits that come from households and 
from non-financial corporations are similar (between 35% and 40%, see Chart 2.17.B).
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Dealogic and Banco de España.
a Latest data: 26 October.
b Senior debt, covered bonds and subordinated debt tier I and tier II issues. Retained issues are not included.
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In the past year the interest rates on deposits continued their downward trend. Despite this, 
the retail deposits taken by Spanish institutions (deposits from households and non-financial 
corporations), analysed using data from individual financial statements, corresponding to 
business in Spain, grew by 2.8% year-on-year at June 2016 (see Chart 2.18.A), constituting 
an entrenchment of the upward trend in rates of change initiated in early 2015. Despite 
the low yield offered by deposits, the similarly low returns on their alternatives and the 
notable stock market volatility made the aforementioned recovery possible. However, 
also owing to this low yield, it was only sight deposits which grew in the past year (15.6% 
at June 2016), this growth having accelerated in comparison with that a year earlier. 
Meanwhile, time deposits continued to fall, although their rate of decline moderated from 
17.3% at June 2015 to 14.6% at June 2016 (see Chart 2.18.B).
As has been occurring in previous years, in the past year the decrease in lending and the 
recovery of deposits from households and non-financial corporations resulted in a 
decline in the loan-deposit ratio, continuing a marked downward trend initiated in 2007 
(see Chart 2.18.C). A general analysis of certain liquidity risk indicators faced by Spanish 
institutions can be found in Box 2.3. 
Retail deposits recovered 
slightly in the past year, 
despite the continuing 
downward trend in interest 
rates 
The loan-deposit ratio 
again decreased, as in 
previous years 
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Meanwhile, the net assets of investment funds decreased at end-2015 and at the beginning 
of 2016 as a result of the negative yields reflecting the financial market instability at those 
dates. From March the net assets of investment funds began to grow due to both positive 
yields and to an increase in net subscriptions. This trend was cut short by the fall at June 
due to the negative yields brought by the Brexit. July saw a notable rise, while the latest 
available data, relating to August, point to continued growth in their net assets, albeit slight 
(see Chart 2.18.D). In all, from August 2015 to August 2016 the net assets of investment 
funds grew by nearly €7 billion, up 3.2%. 
To isolate and measure the extent of shadow banking by financial intermediaries, the FSB 
has so far focused on the entities in the financial institutions sector which it defines as “other 
financial intermediaries” (OFIs) (see country comparison of the financial system structure in 
Chart 2.19.A), adjusting their value downward to exclude institutions not involved in credit 
intermediation and those whose activities do not generate risks of this type. Thus determined, 
the size of shadow banking in Spain comes to nearly 5% of the total assets of financial 
institutions. This figure is no higher than in other advanced countries (see Chart 2.19.B). This 
relative size suggests that these sources of alternative financing for the Spanish economy 
cannot have a very significant impact on the credit market in the short term, although there 
may be incipient developments which should be appropriately monitored.
The percentage of shadow 
banking in Spain is nearly 5% 
of the total assets of financial 
institutions, no higher than in 
other advanced countries 
SOURCES: CNMV and Banco de España.
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This Box analyses representative measures of the systemic 
liquidity risk of Spanish banks, defined as the tendency of financial 
institutions to underestimate, normally under favourable market 
conditions, the possibility that they will be unable to obtain funding 
on the markets at a reasonable price. On occasions this leads to 
liquidity “imbalances” which are corrected in a disorderly fashion. 
In these stressed conditions, not only is high-quality funding 
(capital, long-term debt) harder to obtain, but also the disposal of 
securities portfolios is hindered, which may feed back into 
heightened market stress.
This risk can be divided into two components. The first is funding 
liquidity risk (FLR), i.e. the risk of finding it difficult to make planned 
cash outflows (e.g. debt repayments) through recourse to new 
financing. To analyse this risk, the “liquidity” of bank balance 
sheets is examined from the standpoint of liabilities (type of 
funding and its cost) and of assets (liquid versus illiquid assets). 
The second component is market liquidity risk (MLR), i.e. the risk 
of being unable to sell a financial asset quickly without substantially 
affecting its price, and it is analysed using indicators such as the 
cost of operating in a financial centre or the volume traded per 
period in that centre. 
In recent years the FLR of the main banking systems has tended to 
decrease, since bank funding sources have become more stable 
and their securities portfolios currently contain predominantly higher-
REPRESENTATIVE INDICATORS OF THE SYSTEMIC LIQUIDITY RISK OF SPANISH BANKS BOX 2.3
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through instruments such as covered bonds or senior or 
subordinated securities has fallen sharply, providing an incentive 
to lengthen the maturities of new issues (lower risk of mismatch 
between assets and liabilities and therefore greater liquidity). As 
regards assets, the higher sovereign debt holdings in bank 
securities portfolios, in principle the most liquid on the market, 
would represent an improvement in liquidity (see Chart B). At 
present, these securities account for around 71% of the debt 
securities held by the Spanish banking system, compared with 
38% in 2007.
The behaviour of FLR must, as noted above, be compared with that 
of the MLR to which Spanish banks are exposed. This risk is the 
subject of much debate in international circles because there have 
been numerous changes in financial market participants (lower 
dealer activity, higher weight of electronic platforms in debt security 
markets and increased trading through computer algorithms, 
greater presence of held-to-maturity investors, etc.) which may 
alter market liquidity, while at the same time there have been 
several atypical one-off movements in market trading. However, 
this concept is difficult to measure because it is approximated by 
means of various indicators which do not always send the same 
signal. As an illustration, we analyse below the liquidity indicators 
of the two securities representing the bulk of Spanish institutions’ 
domestic portfolio: Treasury debt and the IBEX 35. These measures 
capture desirable market liquidity characteristics: 1) low transaction 
costs (bid-ask spread), 2) high trading activity (volume traded, 
turnover ratio), 3) ability to absorb orders placed on the markets 
without sharp price movements (Amihud and HH ratios), and 4) 
efficient price formation (MEC measure). Charts C and D compare 
these indicators in three periods (before the financial crisis, during 
the crisis and the present).
quality assets which are more easily sold, such as government debt. 
This development reflects the rebalancing of assets and liabilities 
following the financial crisis and the influence of the new regulatory 
framework in which certain liquidity requirements, such as the LCR 
(liquidity coverage ratio) and the NSFR (net stable funding ratio), are 
in the process of being implemented. Where more doubts arise, 
however, is in the exposure of institutions to MLR. The concerns 
voiced by some organisations (IMF, Bank of England) over the 
apparent lack of liquidity of some secondary markets suggest that 
this risk may have increased recently.
The latter has implications for financial stability: if the MLR has 
increased because markets are less liquid, institutions will find it 
harder to convert securities into cash, even though their securities 
portfolios contain an increasingly larger proportion of highly liquid 
assets (government debt). In stressed situations, banks may incur 
losses on the sale of securities and their access to certain funding 
sources may be restricted through, for example, higher collateral 
requirements, which tend to aggravate market liquidity problems.
We present below Spanish bank metrics relating to the two risk 
components under analysis.
Following the financial crisis and, above all, the sovereign debt 
crisis, the liquidity position of Spanish institutions in terms of FLR 
improved significantly, in much the same way as noted above for 
the main banking systems. Thus the proportion of stable liabilities 
on bank balance sheets has improved notably due, among other 
things, to a higher weight of ORS (other resident sector) deposits 
and of equity and a lower dependence on interbank financing (see 
Chart A). Also, it should be recalled that since the sovereign 
tensions eased, the cost of raising other funds on the market 
BOX 2.3REPRESENTATIVE INDICATORS OF THE SYSTEMIC LIQUIDITY RISK OF SPANISH BANKS (cont’d)
SOURCES: Banco de España y Datastream.
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noticeable. Finally, the MEC measure does not change significantly 
in the two periods.
To conclude, an improvement in the funding profile of Spanish 
institutions is discernible, which, accompanied by a larger buffer 
of liquid assets, reduces exposure to FLR. However, in the 
exposure to systemic liquidity risk, which encompasses FLR and 
MLF, some deterioration is apparent, albeit not for all indicators. 
Since, furthermore, these indicators do not contribute to the same 
extent, the analysis must be carried out with caution and a firm 
conclusion cannot be reached regarding systemic liquidity risk.
According to these measures, the metric showing a clear 
improvement in liquidity with respect to the pre-crisis period is 
that of transaction costs (in the case of the IBEX 35). In the other 
indicators, there are some signs of deterioration. Thus, trading 
activity, defined as the volume of securities traded in a period, 
exceeds the pre-crisis level in Treasury debt but not in the IBEX 
35; however, when this measure is divided by the size of each 
market (turnover ratios), liquidity declines in all centres. Market 
capacity to absorb orders (Amihud and HH ratios) worsens 
substantially in the IBEX 35, while in the case of Treasury debt, 
the signs are not so clear, although a certain deterioration is 
In the first six months of 2016, the consolidated income attributable to the controlling 
company posted by the aggregate of Spanish deposit institutions exceeded €7.6 billion, 
nearly 30% less than in the same period of 2015 (see Annex 2). This decrease meant that 
the return on assets (ROA) after tax of total Spanish deposit institutions fell by 17 basis 
points (bp) in the past year, from 0.59% at June 2015 to 0.42% at June 2016. In the 
same line, the return on equity (ROE) after tax also dropped, this time by more than 2.5 
pp, from 8.8% in the previous year to 6.1% in the current year, slightly above the 
European average and the average of the SSM countries (on EBA data at June 2016,10 
see Chart 2.20). 
Chart 2.21.A sets out the contribution of the main income statement items to consolidated 
income, measured in terms of average total assets (ATAs), and the change from one year 
to the next, which resulted in a decrease of 17 bp in ROA. The only item which improved 
from June 2015 to June 2016 was impairment losses on financial assets, which continued 
its downward trend uninterrupted since end-2012 (see Chart 2.21.B). The contribution of 
commissions and operating expenses, measured in ATA terms, held steady in the past 
year. By contrast, net interest income, gains on financial transactions (including exchange 
differences) and the other items made a smaller contribution to the final profit posted at 
June 2016.
10  The data refer to a sample of 198 banks and are available at: http://www.eba.europa.eu/riskanalysis-and-data/
risk-dashboard
2.2 Profitability
In the first half of 2016 
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Most of the fall (nearly 37% year-on-year, see Annex 2) in gains on financial transactions 
was caused by developments in exchange differences, due largely to the depreciation of 
sterling throughout the first half of 2016, derived from the uncertainty over the UK 
referendum. As noted above (see Chart 2.2.A), the UK market is that to which Spanish 
institutions are most highly exposed.
At the top of the income statement, the items which best reflect the pure banking business, 
i.e. financial revenue and financial costs, fell in the same proportion, by 3.2% year-on-year 
in the past year, giving rise to a fall in net interest income also of 3.2%. In previous periods, 
net interest income had not decreased because the financial costs fell by more than 
financial revenue. However, as remarked in previous FSRs, there is less and less scope to 
continue cutting financial costs.
The euro area’s expansionary monetary policy has taken market interest rates to low, and 
in some cases negative, levels. The persistence of a low interest rate scenario puts 
pressure on net interest income, although it also helps to alleviate the financial burden of 
borrowers, particularly in countries like Spain where the relative weight of variable-rate 
loans is high. Against this background, it is relevant to reflect on the situation in the 
European banking systems and look at the characteristics determining the state of their 
income statements.
For example, it is relevant to examine, in terms of efficiency, how income is generated by 
the various banking systems. In other words, we wish to know how much it costs 
institutions to obtain their income. The more efficient institutions are using their resources 
to generate income, the more they are able to regenerate any income eroded by situations 
such as the current very low interest rate scenario. Chart 2.22 shows how the Spanish 
banking system is more efficient (lower efficiency ratio) than the main European countries 
and than the European average. That is to say, the cost incurred by Spanish banks in terms 
of income obtained is among the lowest in the main European banking systems. Therefore, 
an alternative for coping with a situation of continually narrowing margins is to keep 
working to make banking operations as efficient as possible.
Financial costs did not 
decrease enough to offset 
the drop in financial revenue, 
so net interest income fell 
The efficiency of the Spanish 
banking system exceeds 
that of the main European 
countries and is higher than 
the European average 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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On individual financial statement data, the profitability of Spanish banks in their business in 
Spain in the first half of 2016 behaved similarly to that of consolidated activity overall, although 
the bottom line was somewhat less negative. Thus income before tax decreased by only 
3.5% with respect to June last year, resulting in ROE of 5.7%. The main reason for this smaller 
decrease in income is the significant fall in impairment losses on financial assets, which were 
down by more than 40% in the past year, compared with 21% at consolidated level.
By contrast, net interest income in business in Spain fell more sharply than at overall 
consolidated level. Between June 2015 and June 2016 net interest income decreased by 
9.4%. Chart 2.23.A shows the percentage of this decrease explained by each element. 
The effect of the interest rates applied to interest-earning assets and interest-bearing 
liabilities (price effect, determined by the very low lending interest rates and the scant 
room for further falls in deposit interest rates) is what explains most of the decrease in net 
interest income in the first half of 2016. In the previous year this impact was also negative, 
but less marked than in the current year. In the first half of 2016, the marginal rates on new 
loans fell by more than the marginal rates on new deposits, which, given their current level, 
have little room left to continue decreasing (see Chart 2.23.B).
Bank profits in Spain 
are moving in line with those 
at consolidated overall level… 
…although net interest 
income fell more sharply 
in business in Spain 
SOURCE: EBA.
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The impact of activity on net interest income (quantity effect) was also negative in the first 
half of 2016 and its magnitude was very similar to that of the previous year, a sign that 
banking activity is not rallying (as described above, the total volume of lending continues 
to decrease, Chart 2.6.A). Finally, the contribution of changes in the asset and liability mix 
(structural effect) although it continues to be positive, is notably weaker than in the previous 
year and insufficient to offset the aforementioned negative impacts.
As noted above, on the liabilities side there is not much room left for further cuts, given the 
low level of interest rates on new sight and time deposits from households and non-
financial corporations (see Chart 2.24.A). Along these same lines, Chart 2.24.B shows that 
the largest falls in the average cost of liabilities between June 2015 and June 2016 were at 
institutions whose average cost at June 2015 was higher. In other words, the institutions 
with a very low cost of liabilities have little room for manoeuvre to continue reducing their 
funding costs.
In business in Spain, the income from financial transactions also decreased notably in the 
first half of 2016. This decrease was offset by the rise in dividend income, so the fall in 
gross income (8.8%) was similar to that in net interest income. Meanwhile, operating 
expenses increased very slightly, which, along with the fall in gross income, reduced net 
operating income, and only the aforementioned sharp decrease in asset impairment 
provisions improved the net income of business in Spain.
As regards operating expenses, in line with the aforementioned comments on the efficiency 
ratio, the process of capacity adjustment continued through the reduction of staff and 
offices (see Chart 2.25.A). If the adjustment made by the Spanish banking system is 
compared with that of the main European countries, it can be seen that at December 2015 
Spain remained the system with the most offices per inhabitant, although the gap with 
other countries has decreased significantly since the onset of the financial crisis (see Chart 
2.25.B). As for average office size, Spain stands out as having the smallest offices, coming 
last among the countries analysed in terms of staff per office, and it is also among the 
countries with the lowest volume of assets per office, although this latter indicator has 
increased in recent years (see Charts 2.25.C and 2.25.D). Looking forward, technological 
investment will be another challenge which institutions will have to address and which will 
unquestionably have a significant impact on their income statements.
There is progressively 
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In summary, the profitability of the Spanish banking sector continues to be subject to 
pressure from various sources, such as a business volume which continues to fall in Spain, 
a decreasing but still high level of non-performing loans, and a low interest rate environment. 
The low interest rates reduce bank profitability not only in Spain but also in the rest of Europe. 
Against this background, there are certain factors which banks have to continue strengthening 
as an alternative form of restoring some of their eroded income. One of these is operational 
efficiency, i.e. incurring the lowest possible costs in the conduct of business. In general, 
institutions have to continue searching for ways to adapt their business model to the 
environment, striving not only to gain efficiency, but also searching for alternative sources of 
income and how to provide supplementary services and even exploring possible corporate 
operations, since usually by their very nature bring efficiency gains in the medium term.
This pressure on bank profits is one of the factors affecting the stock market performance 
of banks. So far this year, their stock market performance has generally trended downwards. 
The beginning of the year saw an initial correction of bank share prices, which recovered 
from mid-February. In June, particularly towards the end of the month, there was a marked 
drop in share prices, which was accentuated by the negative result of the referendum on 
whether the United Kingdom should remain in the EU (the falls in the banking sector 
indices of the main European countries were between 13% and 22% on Friday 24 June, 
the day after the referendum). From these lows, share prices have been progressively 
recovering. Chart 2.26.A shows that the performance of the Spanish banking sector during 
In short, the profitability 
of the Spanish banking sector 
and of the other euro area 
countries is subject to 
pressure from various 
sources 
The stock market prices 
of European banks have 
continued to trend downwards 
this year
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the year has been comparatively better than that of the other European countries, standing 
at the level of France and above the European and euro area averages, the price correction 
nevertheless being around 10% since the start of the year.
The share price slump gave rise to a widespread drop in the price-to-book value of European 
banks (see Chart 2.26.B). However, the decrease was not so pronounced for the Spanish 
banking sector, so the behaviour of this metric allowed it to maintain its notable position 
relative to the main European banking systems, despite a value clearly below unity.
The stock market performance of banks is important because low share prices make it 
harder for them to increase capital to strengthen their solvency levels. This is analysed in 
the next section.
In June 2016 the ratio of highest-quality capital, i.e. common equity tier 1 (CET1) stood at 
12.4% for total Spanish deposit institutions. The ratio, scarcely differing from June 2015 
(see Chart 2.27), amply exceeded the regulatory requirement.11
Both the total capital ratio and the tier 1 capital ratio increased by nearly 20 bp between 
June 2015 and June 2016. Thus the total capital ratio reached 14.4% at June 2015 and the 
11  The progressive application (phase-in) of the capital conservation buffer, which in 2016 raises by 0.625% the 
CET1 minimum requirement of 4.5%, commences on 1 January 2016.
2.3 Solvency 
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tier 1 capital ratio was 12.6%, slightly above the CET1 ratio due to the effect of gradual 
transitional adjustments, particularly in relation to deductions.12
As regards the composition of own funds, these consist mainly of common equity tier 1 
capital, which accounts for 86% (see Chart 2.28.B), while the rest comes mostly from tier 2 
capital, although additional tier 1 capital has increased in the past year. 
Chart 2.28.C breaks down common equity tier 1 capital in terms of risk-weighted assets. 
It shows, as regards eligible capital, that equity instruments are the main component 
(45%), followed in quantitative importance by reserves (34%). Thus these two items 
together account for practically 80% of CET1, which is completed by transitional 
adjustments (12%) and minority interests and other (9%). For their part, nearly two-thirds 
of deductions arise from goodwill and other intangible assets, while those derived from 
deferred tax assets represent 16% and other deductions account for 19%. 
As regards the denominator of the capital ratios, risk-weighted assets (RWAs) exceeded 
€1,683 billion at June 2016, having remained relatively steady throughout the past year (up by 
0.2%, see Chart 2.28.A). Given that the total assets of deposit institutions also held relatively 
12  The ratios take into account the transitional adjustments designed to facilitate the progressive implementation 
of Basel III. The implementation timetable establishes generally in 2016 that 60% of the amounts of deductions 
will be deducted from common equity, while the remaining 40% will be deducted from additional tier 1 capital.
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steady in the past year (up slightly by 0.4%), RWAs as a percentage of total assets barely 
changed from June 2015 to June 2016, standing at 45.8%. Also, the composition of RWAs 
remained unchanged during the past year. Credit and counterparty risk13 constitute the vast 
bulk of RWAs (87%), followed by operational risk (9%), while position, foreign exchange and 
commodity and other risks account for less than 5% of RWAs (see Chart 2.28.D).
In July this year the EBA published the results of its stress test (for a summary of these 
results, see Box 2.4) and, as in previous FSRs, this allows us to compare the solvency of 
the banking systems of the various European countries (represented by a small number of 
banks per country with a substantial relative weight). On December 2015 data, the CET1 
ratio (including transitional adjustments) of Spanish banks was low with respect to the 
European countries, and around 70 bp below the European average (see Chart 2.29.A). 
Chart 2.29.B shows how the CET1 ratio changed between the stress test conducted by the 
EBA in 2014 (data as at December 2013) and the exercise last July (data as at December 
2015), and gives the contribution to that change from each of the components of the ratio, 
i.e. CET1 capital and RWAs. It shows that the CET1 ratio increased for practically all 
European countries, driven by an increase in CET1 capital and, in most countries, also by a 
decrease in the volume of RWAs (since it is in the denominator of the ratio, when RWAs 
13  This risk comprises that from credit exposures, equity exposures and securitisation positions, and includes 
both that calculated using RWAs obtained by the standardised method and that obtained by the IRB method.
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The 2016 EBA stress test (ST), the results of which were published 
on 29 July this year, encompassed 51 banks from 15 countries of 
the EU and the European Economic Area (37 banks from SSM 
countries and 14 banks from Denmark, Hungary, Norway, Poland, 
Sweden and the UK). Of them, six are Spanish (representing 
around 80% of the total assets of the Spanish banking sector), 
making Spain the country with the third highest number of 
institutions in the exercise, after Germany and France.
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE 2016 EBA STRESS TEST BOX 2.4
decrease the CET1 ratio rises). The growth of the CET1 ratio for Spain was very similar to 
the European average, around 2 pp, and is explained by an increase in CET1 capital which 
offsets the increase in the volume of RWAs. In other countries (Sweden, Norway, Belgium, 
Austria and Italy), the increase in the capital ratio was driven substantially by a fall in RWAs.
Chart 2.29.C sets out the Texas ratio, another measure of institutions’ solvency which shows, 
in particular, how the problem assets of institutions may affect their solvency. To calculate this 
ratio, which is based on stress test data, non-performing loans are divided by the sum of 
capital (including eligible equity instruments like CET1 and reserves) and provisions.14 This 
metric shows that the Spanish banking system stands in an intermediate position with respect 
to the other European countries and, although slightly above the European average, it is a 
good distance away from the countries whose ratios are near to unity (Texas ratios above unity 
indicate problematic situations because non-productive assets are not fully covered).
14  Since foreclosed asset data are not available for each country, only non-performing loans are included in the 
numerator, along with the related provisions in the denominator.
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cumulative increase of 5.8% in the EU in the three-year time 
horizon under the baseline scenario is expected, while under the 
adverse scenario a cumulative fall of 1.8% is estimated. In the 
case of Spain, the cumulative change in GDP under the baseline 
scenario is 7.1%, while under the adverse scenario a cumulative 
change of 0% was assumed. Chart A depicts the changes in GDP 
under the baseline scenario and the cumulative change in the 
three years, for Spain and the EU.
Although the rate of change is more favourable for Spain than for 
the EU on average when they are compared with each other, the 
severity of the scenario is similar. This is due to the levels set for the 
baseline scenario, such that if the difference in GDP growth between 
the adverse scenario and the baseline scenario for Spain and the 
EU average is compared, those differences are fairly similar. Chart B 
shows the changes in the adverse scenario and the difference in 
cumulative GDP in the three years in pp from the baseline scenario, 
which is very similar in Spain (7.1 pp) and the EU (7.6 pp).
It should be remembered that the adverse scenario represents an 
extreme macroeconomic situation with a low likelihood of occurrence 
which seeks to identify weaknesses in the banking system if a set of 
plausible but very unlikely systemic risks materialises.
The 2016 EBA stress test shows the transitional ratio of CET1 
capital to risk-weighted assets (RWAs). At aggregate level, the 
To obtain the results, a single methodology and scenarios 
applicable to all institutions were defined to ensure homogeneity 
and comparability among institutions. Each bank conducts its own 
stress test, according to the common methodology published by 
the EBA but using its own models, in what is known as a bottom-
up ST. These methods allow a calculation of how capital is 
impacted by credit risk, market risk, net interest income, 
operational risk and other income. 
The objective of the stress test organised by the EBA was to 
provide supervisors, banks and other market participants with 
solvency measures comparable across institutions in adverse 
economic situations.
The stress test is based on estimating the impact of shocks with a 
time horizon of three years. On this occasion, as in the 2014 
exercise, the estimation relies on a “static balance sheet” 
assumption, i.e. the balance sheet data used and set for the three 
years of the stress test time horizon were those as at December 
2015. Recapitalisation processes carried out in 2016 were not 
taken into account.
The exercise considered two scenarios, baseline and adverse, 
both with a three-year time horizon (2016-2018). These scenarios 
include the expected changes in the main macroeconomic 
variables identified. One of the most important is GDP, for which a 
BOX 2.4ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE 2016 EBA STRESS TEST (cont’d)
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ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE 2016 EBA STRESS TEST (cont’d) BOX 2.4
those of Ireland, with a decrease of 7.1 pp, and Norway where, by 
contrast, the CET1 ratio under the adverse scenario for 2018 is 
equal to that in 2015 and the change is thus 0 pp.1
Chart H compares the results of the 2016 exercise with those 
obtained in 2014, analysing the values of the aggregate CET1 ratio in 
each country.2 Specifically, it shows the impact on CET1 under the 
adverse scenario in the 2014 exercise and the 2016 exercise for 
each country. In all cases except Belgium, the capital ratio decreases 
more in the 2016 exercise. Particularly notable is the difference 
between the exercises in Spain (1.4 pp in 2014 against 3.9 pp in 
2016)3 and the Netherlands (2.5 pp in 2014 versus 4.8 pp in 2016).
The results of the EBA stress test for Spain show that the institutions 
included in the exercise, which represent 80% of the Spanish 
banking system, have a high resilience to the adverse scenario.
starting point of this CET1 ratio for total institutions is 13.2%. In 
the case of Spain, the initial level of this ratio is 12.5%.
Chart C compares the starting value of the ratio (December 2015) 
with the estimated ratio under the baseline scenario for 2018 for total 
institutions. It shows that the ratio increases by 0.7 pp from 13.2% to 
13.9% (up 6%). In the case of Spain the ratio rises by 0.3 pp from 
12.5% to 12.8%, as shown in Chart D, an increase of 3%. It can thus 
be said that, under the baseline scenario, with notable economic 
growth sustained over time, the capital ratio of Spanish banks 
improves significantly.
Chart E compares the starting value of the ratio (December 2015) 
with the estimated ratio under the adverse scenario for 2018 for 
total institutions. It shows that the ratio decreases by 3.8 pp from 
13.2% to 9.4% (down 29%). In the case of Spain the ratio 
decreases by 3.9 pp from 12.5% to 8.6%, which, as seen in Chart 
F, represents a decline of 31%.
Chart G shows the change in pp by country between the current 
value of the CET1 ratio and its estimated value under the adverse 
scenario for 2018. It indicates that, as mentioned above, the 
estimated change for total institutions is 3.8 pp, very similar to that 
in Spain where the change is 3.9 pp. The most notable cases are 
In recent years the BdE has worked to improve its internal tool used to prospectively 
analyse the solvency and measure the resilience of Spanish institutions under different 
macroeconomic scenarios. This BdE analysis exercise is in line with others conducted 
internationally, for example the US Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) or 
the European stress tests conducted by the EBA. 
The methodology developed by the BdE is based on a macroprudential tool which is 
highly granular due to the type of data used and employs homogeneous assumptions 
defined by the regulator (top-down approach). This analysis framework, which receives the 
2.4 Forward-looking 
assessment of the 
Spanish banking system’s 
resilience to adverse 
macroeconomic scenarios 
The Banco de España 
conducts forward-looking...
1  It should be taken into account that only one Norwegian institution was 
included in the EBA stress test.
2  In making the comparison, the institutions included in each country are 
only those present in the two stress tests (51 institutions).
3  Part of this difference is due to the impact of transitional adjustments 
and the application of prudential filters (sovereign risk), specifically to 
their progressive elimination in capital deductions. The inclusion of 
operational risk also contributes to explaining this difference.
SOURCE: EBA.
a The chart shows the percentage points change in the CET1 ratio under the adverse scenario of the 2014 and 2016 EBA stress tests.
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name of FLESB (Forward Looking Exercise on Spanish Banks),15 has been used by the 
BdE every year since its roll-out to analyse the resilience of Spanish institutions. In each 
exercise efforts have been made to improve its stress test methodology, in terms of both 
the data used and the main calculation methods employed.
The FLESB tool uses macroeconomic scenarios that have to be stringent but plausible to 
calculate expected credit losses over a specific time horizon.16 This impairment of exposures 
is then compared with the loss-absorbing items, such as existing provisions, estimated 
profit before provisions for the analysis time horizon and the excess capital available. 
The methodology underlying these assessment processes differs depending on whether 
they are bottom-up exercises, such as those of the EBA, which are subsequently subject 
to quality control by the European Central Bank (ECB) in the case of institutions belonging 
to the SSM, or whether they are top-down, such as those conducted using the FLESB or 
those performed half-yearly by the ECB and published in its Financial Stability Review on 
an aggregate basis. 
As a result of the two different approaches used, the EBA exercise and the internal BdE 
exercise differ notably both in the methodology used and in the types of risks analysed, 
which may give rise to significant discrepancies in the results finally obtained. Therefore 
these two exercises should be regarded as complementary. The main differences between 
the two exercises may be summarised as follows:
(1) First, a significant difference is the assumption about how institutions’ balance sheets 
change during the exercise. The EBA exercise is conducted under the static balance sheet 
assumption, i.e. that there is no change in the volume of exposure over the time horizon of 
the exercise, although risk-weighted assets (RWAs) may increase due to credit quality 
impairment. For its part, the BdE tool allows changes in exposure consistent with the 
macroeconomic scenario used. For example, if the macro scenario predicts a contraction 
in the aggregate credit volume, the FLESB methodology transforms this assumption into a 
decrease in the volume of exposure and RWAs. Under the FLESB framework, credit quality 
impairment is also transformed into increases in RWAs.
(2) A second major source of differences is how income statements are modelled. The 
European exercise is based on imposing a set of constraints on the various income 
statement lines (it generally stipulates a series of floors for expenses or ceilings for 
revenue). The framework for estimating net interest income is particularly important and 
includes a series of floors and ceilings on interest rates along with certain assumptions on 
the pass-through of reference rates to the institutions’ asset and liability rates.
Meanwhile, the BdE approach is based on the so-called funding plans of individual 
institutions (the business volume and earnings projections prepared by the institutions 
themselves), adjusted internally by the BdE (through generally conservative adjustments 
to the funding plans) to adapt them to and reconcile them with the FLESB macroeconomic 
scenarios.
15  The main characteristics of this tool and the methodology and type of information used were extensively described 
in the November 2013 FSR: http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/Secciones/Publicaciones/InformesBoletinesRevistas/
InformesEstabilidadFinancera/13/IEF_Ing_Noviembre2013.pdf
16  The importance of scenario feasibility must not divert our attention from the fact that the value added is found 
when assessing the impact on the solvency of the institutions analysed that is caused by a given shock involving 
a certain deviation from the baseline or central scenario.
...analyses of the solvency of 
Spanish institutions (FLESB)… 
…to examine, under different 
macroeconomic scenarios, 
their capacity to absorb 
expected credit losses
The top-down 
methodology used 
differs from the bottom-up 
methodology used 
by the EBA
The EBA exercise is 
conducted under the static 
balance sheet assumption, 
while the FLESB allows 
changes in exposure 
according to the scenario 
considered 
The EBA analysis imposes 
restrictions on changes in 
income statement items… 
…the FLESB, by contrast, 
is based on institutions’ 
forecasts, adjusted to reflect 
the macroeconomic scenario
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(3) The scope of the exercise differs in the EBA and BdE frameworks as regards the 
geographical definition of risks and the inclusion of certain risks. While the scope of 
consolidation for the EBA exercise is the whole world when it comes to establishing the 
volume of exposure or risk subject to analysis, that of the BdE exercise focuses on 
business in Spain, given the available information and the desired granularity. The FLESB 
only considers credit risk, which is the main banking risk, while the EBA exercise also 
considers other risks, such as operational risk.
(4) The macroeconomic scenarios used also differ somewhat. Specifically, the exercise 
conducted by the BdE uses a baseline scenario, an adverse scenario and a severely 
adverse scenario, while that of the EBA only uses the first two scenarios. The baseline 
scenario of the BdE coincides with the baseline scenario used by the EBA and is the best 
estimate of future macroeconomic conditions, subject to the uncertainty inherent in any 
macroeconomic projection. This scenario is based on the European Commission’s 
projections from last autumn.17 The adverse scenario also coincides with that used by the 
EBA in this year’s 2016 stress test.18
17  For a description of the fundamentals of the European Commission autumn projections, see the link: http://
www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1383302/2016+EU-wide+stress+test-Explanatory+note+on+baseline.
pdf. For the specific values of the projections of the macro variables, see the link: http://www.eba.europa.eu/
documents/10180/1383302/2016+EU-wide+stress+test-Adverse+macro-financial+scenario.pdf
18  The narrative of this scenario, along with its description and the values estimated for a set of significant 
macroeconomic variables can be found at the link: http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1383302/2016+EU-
wide+stress+test-Adverse+macro-financial+scenario.pdf
The scope of consolidation is 
worldwide in the EBA exercise 
and national in the FLESB 
exercise
In addition to the baseline 
and adverse scenarios defined 
by the EBA…
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The difference in scenarios with respect to the EBA stress test therefore lies in the use by 
the FLESB of a third, severely adverse scenario. Its objective is to provide an additional 
level of macroeconomic stress to the exercise and mitigate the possibility of omitting risks 
accumulated since the scenario-fixing date, which in the case of the EBA was six months 
before the stress test was conducted. 
The differences in the rate of change of the Spain’s GDP across the three scenarios used 
in the BdE exercise are shown in Chart 2.30. This variable is used to summarise the change 
in the level of stress between the scenarios, which however comprise a wider set of 
variables. The data cut-off date for the exercise is December 2015 and the time horizon 
covers the years 2016, 2017 and 2018.
Specifically, the adverse scenario entails zero growth of economic activity in cumulative 
terms, while the severely adverse scenario features a cumulative fall in GDP of 3.6%, i.e. a 
severe recession in the Spanish economy over the next three years. It can be seen how, 
compared with the nearly 7.5 pp by which the adverse scenario differs from the baseline 
scenario, the severely adverse scenario departs from the baseline scenario by somewhat 
more than 10.5 pp.19
Results of the FLESB methodology
Before analysing the results of applying the FLESB, it is necessary to define the various 
groups of institutions encompassed by the exercise, which differ from those of the EBA 
exercise. The group of Spanish institutions with significant international activity20 is 
analysed separately due to its special features. Specifically, since the FLESB focuses on 
business in Spain, exposures abroad are not directly subject to impact and therefore no 
credit loss should be deducted from the amount of capital considered within the full 
regulatory perimeter.
In this respect, it should be noted that the volume of provisions used relates only to those 
covering the exposures considered, i.e. they do not include those recorded to cover 
international non-performing loans. For its part, the estimation of the ability to generate 
income does include the full scope of consolidation and net income from international 
activity is subject to a specific estimate (stressed in the case of the adverse scenario) on 
the basis of the international scenarios involved. This projection of international net income 
is the channel through which exposures abroad affect the consolidated group’s capital.
Based on the above, the results set out below classify the institutions on the basis of their 
degree of international exposure. Chart 2.31 shows the performance of the transitional 
CET1 capital ratio21 under the baseline scenario (the most likely central scenario) for the 
19  Three scenarios are used, for example, in the US CCAR, where there is always a severely adverse scenario with 
a marked recession.
20  In accordance with Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 680/2014 of 16 April 2014 laying down 
technical standards with regard to supervisory reporting of institutions, an institution is deemed to engage in 
significant international activity when the non-domestic original exposures in all “non-domestic” countries and 
in all categories of exposure are equal to or higher than 10% of total domestic and non-domestic original 
exposures reported to such effect. In this connection, three institutions have been identified as meeting this 
condition which, as at December 2015, accounted for 62% of the total assets of the Spanish banking system 
at consolidated level.
21  The transitional CET1 ratio is calculated as the sum of all eligible capital instruments at a given date less 
adjusted deductions, in accordance with the phase-in schedule established by the regulation, at that date. 
Specifically, the CET1 at December 2018 would include the capital requirement items at 2018 less the 
deductions adjusted by the related phase-in at that date.
…the FLESB incorporates 
an additional scenario 
characterised by greater 
macroeconomic deterioration
The adverse scenario is 
characterised by zero GDP 
growth and under the severely 
adverse scenario this variable 
falls by 3.6% in cumulative 
terms 
Under the baseline scenario, 
the CET1 ratio improves 
in all the groups of institutions 
considered
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different groups of institutions encompassed in the exercise: institutions with significant 
international activity, SSM institutions excluding those with significant international activity 
and the major institutions under direct national supervision (less significant institutions: 
credit cooperatives, two savings banks and four sizeable banks). An improvement can be 
observed in the ratio at end-December 2018 across the three groups, ranging from 0.6 pp 
for institutions with international activity to almost 2 pp for the less significant institutions 
under direct national supervision.
The results change radically when the exercise is stressed, i.e. when the institutions’ 
resilience under adverse economic scenarios is analysed. Thus, the impact on the 
transitional CET1 capital ratio under the adverse and severely adverse scenarios for 
institutions with significant international activity may be observed (see Chart 2.32). In 
particular, the estimated impact on the transitional CET1 capital ratio in 2018 under the 
severely adverse scenario amounts to 1.4 pp of the ratio, i.e. estimated losses and other 
capital deductions22 exceed the total volume of items capable of absorbing them 
(provisions and income). At end-2018 this group of institutions experiences a moderate fall 
in the transitional CET1 ratio, from 12.4% in 2015 to 11% in 2018. 
22  The progressive application of greater phase-in percentages causes institutions’ CET1 to change above and 
beyond the impact from the losses incurred in the analysis period, resulting in an additional adjustment residual.
The transitional CET1 ratio 
for institutions with significant 
international activity falls to 
11% in 2018 from 12.4% 
in 2015 under the severely 
adverse scenario…
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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Under the adverse scenario, which coincides with that of the EBA, this group of institutions 
would end the exercise with a capital ratio of 11.6%, with an impact on the ratio of just 0.8 pp. 
As the chart shows, a milder scenario implies lower impact on losses and greater income 
generation capacity and, consequently, a smaller decrease in capital. 
The second group of institutions analysed is that subject to direct supervision by the SSM, 
excluding those with significant international activity. Chart 2.33 shows the impact on 
solvency for this group of institutions under adverse and severely adverse scenarios.
The starting point for this group of institutions in 2015 is a CET1 ratio of 12.7%. As in the 
former group, the volume of projected losses under the severely adverse scenario is not 
absorbed by existing provisions or by projected income for the time horizon established, 
finally giving rise to an impact on capital of 4.7 pp of the ratio. 
Notably, there is a significant volume of estimated losses (17.8% in terms of RWAs), which 
reflects the impact of this scenario on credit exposures (more than double the estimated 
losses of institutions with international activity). Even with such a high volume of losses, 
on completion of the stress exercise the capital ratio for this group of institutions is slightly 
above 8%, also exceeding the regulatory minimum required in 2018, albeit less amply than 
the foregoing group of institutions.
Chart 2.33.A also shows that the impact under the adverse scenario is lower than under 
the severely adverse scenario. In general, the volume of losses is smaller, 1.7 pp less, 
earnings are higher with an additional 0.3 pp of loss absorption capacity and the amount 
of the provisions used is lower owing to the decline in estimated losses. As a result, the 
transitional CET1 capital ratio for 2018 is 2.8 pp lower than for 2015 (the impact is 1.9 pp 
below that of the severely adverse scenario).
Finally, Chart 2.34 sets out the outcome of the stress test on the group of less significant 
institutions that is subject to direct national supervision. The initial CET1 ratio for this 
group is 15.1%, higher than that of the two foregoing groups. The impact on capital in pp 
of RWAs is quite similar to that for the group of institutions with international activity and 
much lower than that estimated for the group of SSM institutions without significant 
international activity. 
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As can be seen, the CET1 solvency ratio at the end of the exercise is also clearly higher 
than the regulatory minimum required at end-2018. The results under the adverse scenario 
imply a decline in the capital ratio of 0.9 pp, to 14.2% at end-2018. Under the severely 
adverse scenario the capital ratio decreases by 1.4 pp, to 13.7%.
The estimated impact on credit losses is slightly higher than for the group of institutions 
with international activity, but clearly lower than for the other SSM institutions. The volume 
of provisions used is in line with the volume of estimated losses. Notably, the ability of less 
significant institutions to generate income under the adverse scenarios is lower than that 
of institutions subject to direct SSM supervision.
In summary, the stress test conducted suggests that although the Spanish banking system 
would experience a significant reduction of capital levels in a severely adverse 
macroeconomic scenario, it would still manage to maintain a level of solvency in excess of 
the regulatory minimum requirement, with more or less slack depending on the type of 
institutions considered. These findings are in line with those obtained by the EBA stress 
test, but because of the differences between the two stress test methodologies (top-down 
vs. bottom-up approach, static or dynamic balance sheet assumption, etc.) and the sample 
of institutions covered in both cases, a direct quantitative comparison is not possible.
These results suggest that 
under the scenarios 
considered, the solvency 
ratios of institutions would 
continue to exceed the 
minimum requirements 
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3  ANALYSIS AND MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY
The Banco de España regularly monitors macroprudential risks using a tool that comprises 
a set of over one hundred indicators in different categories.1 As described in the previous 
FSR, this tool converts into a risk map the information from indicators on credit, the 
housing market, the structure of liquidity, the maturities of bank assets and liabilities, credit 
portfolio concentration and NPLs in the banking system, and the situation on financial 
markets and developments in the real economy. It is, therefore, a tool for monitoring the 
situation of the financial system and the detection of potential systemic risks.
The development of macroprudential risk monitoring and assessment tools is a widespread 
practice internationally. In Basel, the Committee on the Global Financial System has pooled 
the experiences of the different central banks in the ex-ante appraisal of macroprudential 
policy decisions.2 The working group, in which the Banco de España has participated, has 
drawn together numerous case studies and examples that illustrate the different stages of 
the assessment process at the international level with a view to sharing and learning from 
other approaches. In Spain’s case, the risk map is supportive in defining the overall 
macroprudential policy stance. This tool has been further improved in recent months by 
means of the extension of indicators relating to market liquidity and real estate sector prices.
Chart 3.1 shows the situation of the summary risk map at the latest available date. 
Generally, most risk categories (credit, liquidity, financial markets, real economy and 
macroeconomic imbalances) lie outside alert levels or at a low risk level with the exception 
of the banking situation, where a medium-alert level is observed. This is a consequence of 
pre-crisis imbalances materialising as higher bank NPLs. Although NPLs have fallen 
1  Details on the categories of the indicators, their aggregation and the viewing thereof have been published in 
Banco de España Occasional Document 1601.
2  See CGFS (2016), «Experiences with the ex-ante appraisal of macroprudential instruments», CGFS publications 
No 56.
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macroprudential risks
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The heat map levels are shown graphically in seven categories. The credit risk category groups together indicators on the changes in and degree of imbalance 
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estimates as at June 2016. The liquidity risk category includes indicators on bank and market liquidity. The concentration category includes indicators on total 
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between banks and on systemic stress in different markets. The macroeconomic imbalances category includes indicators on external debt, the public sector 
and the current account balance. The real economy category includes indicators on economic growth and unemployment. The NPLs and recourse-to-central 
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notably in the past three years, they continue to be high relative to the historical average, 
as is credit portfolio concentration, the legacy of the previous expansionary phase. The 
concentration and NPLs indicators are more backward-looking than the other indicators, 
which explains their higher level at present. This is why this category remains at a medium-
alert level. Elsewhere, the potential macroeconomic imbalances have continued to improve 
since the last FSR. Both these potential imbalances and the actual conditions of the real 
economy currently lie outside alert levels. A gradual improvement in these risk categories 
has been witnessed since late 2012.
Compared with the situation reflected in the last FSR (with reference to September 2015), 
there has been a slight reduction in risk in the liquidity category, owing to the reduction in 
market volatility in 2016 Q2 following the bouts of turbulence observed in Q1. However, 
bank share prices have diminished significantly and this is reflected in the slight increase 
in risk in the financial markets category. That said, both these categories and that relating 
to credit remain in a situation of low alert, indicating that currently there is no evidence of 
an increase in risks that may jeopardise the stability of the Spanish financial system.
As explained in the previous FSR, the Banco de España has a series of macroprudential 
instruments whose defining characteristics are laid down in European regulations.3 One of 
these instruments is the countercyclical capital buffer (CCB), whose objective is to ensure 
that the banking sector as a whole has an additional capital buffer to help maintain the flow 
of credit to the economy without the system’s solvency being endangered under situations 
of stress in the financial system.
Countercyclical capital buffer
As from 1 January 2016, the Banco de España announces quarterly the CCB-related 
requirements that banks must maintain. For 2016 Q4, the decision was to keep the CCB rate 
applicable to credit exposures in Spain at 0%. This decision is based on the technical analysis 
of specific quantitative indicators, in addition to qualitative information and expert judgement.4 
Table 3.1 shows the status of these indicators as at June 2016. In greater detail, Chart 3.2.A 
shows the credit/GDP ratio and its long-term trend. It can be seen that in the period prior to the 
recent systemic banking crisis (2009 Q2-2013 Q4) there was a notable increase in the economy’s 
indebtedness (with credit as a proportion of GDP rising to 220% in June 2010). Since then, the 
credit/GDP ratio has declined in a sustained fashion and at present stands at close to 170%. 
Consequently, this indicator is consistent with the ongoing correction of the imbalances 
accumulated and, therefore, it does not evidence the need to activate the CCB at present. 
The credit-GDP gap seeks to measure the excess of credit in terms of output relative to its 
long-term or equilibrium level. The credit-GDP gap is calculated as the percentage-point 
difference of the ratio of total credit to the non-financial private sector, divided by GDP, less 
the long-term trend of this ratio estimated using a statistical filter. In June 2016, this 
indicator stood close to –62 pp (see Chart 3.2.B). While some stabilisation seems apparent 
3  EU Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV) and Regulation (EU) 575/2013 (CRR). Also, Banco de España Circular 2/2016 
develops these competencies in a more detailed fashion, along with information transparency requirements and 
the relationship with the European authorities. The use of these regulatory instruments falls under the remit of 
macroprudential policy, whose aim is to contribute to the safeguarding of the financial system as a whole. A 
general description of the Banco de España’s macroprudential policy objectives, instruments and indicators can 
be seen in Occasional Document 1601.
4  The decision taken in September 2016 was based on the information on credit available as at that time, corres-
ponding to March 2016.
3.2  Macroprudential 
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initiatives
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been held at 0% for 2016 Q4
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CCB activation threshold 
suggested by Basel
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since the previous quarter, this figure is clearly far off the activation threshold (2 pp) 
following the pattern suggested by Basel.5
The indicator of credit intensity seeks to capture information on the acceleration in credit 
growth in terms of output over a period of one year. The indicator is calculated as the 
annual change in aggregate credit (numerator) divided by the cumulative output for the 
same period (denominator).6 Chart 3.2.C reveals that although there is a change in trend in 
this indicator as from December 2013, as a result of a slowdown in the decline in aggregate 
credit, it remains as at June 2016 in negative territory. This indicator is, therefore, still 
clearly below levels symptomatic of an excessive acceleration and, accordingly, the need 
to activate the CCB at this point does not arise. 
The private sector debt burden indicator (debt service ratio, DSR) seeks to capture possible 
situations of private sector debt unsustainability enabling anticipation of, inter alia, a 
possible increase in the number of doubtful loans. The DSR is defined as the ratio of 
interest and principal payments to aggregate disposable income, so it measures the 
affordability of debt payments with respect to disposable income.7 Chart 3.2.D shows that 
the level of the indicator has been declining almost constantly since the start of the recent 
crisis. This is consistent with a gradual and sustained correction of the high level of 
indebtedness reached during the run-up to the crisis in the private sector and with a 
significant reduction in the average cost of such debt. Generally, this indicator shows that 
5  Following this rule, when the credit-GDP gap is less than or equal to 2 pp, the corresponding countercyclical 
capital buffer requirement is 0%, and when the credit-GDP gap exceeds 2%, the buffer applicable increases in 
a linear fashion until reaching the level of 2.5% when the credit-GDP gap reaches 10%.
6  In addition, banks’ perception of the sustainability of private indebtedness may encourage/restrict the availabili-
ty of credit in good/bad times, thereby amplifying the fluctuations in the credit cycle. This indicator is included 
under the category “credit measures” within the group of complementary indicators for guiding the setting of the 
CCB in Recommendation ESRB/2014/1.
7  The indicator is constructed according to a standard formula for calculating the present value of a fixed-term 
loan (using the stock of aggregate credit along with an average interest rate and maturity), divided by disposable 
income.
The indicator of credit intensity 
remains in negative territory…
…and the debt burden 
indicator shows improvements 
in the sustainability of private 
sector debt as a whole, owing 
both to the reduction in debt 
and to that in its cost
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a? ????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????? ???????????????????????????
data are provisional estimates as at June 2016.
b The year 1999 marks Spain’s joining the euro area; the year 2008 marks the last year before the start of the recent systemic banking crisis in Spain.
c? ??????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????? ??????????? ?????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????
d? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
e The ranges in each column show minimum and maximum values of a set of indicators of price developments in the real estate sector in respect of their long-term 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
f? ??????? ???????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????? ?????? ???????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
g The indicator of external imbalances is calculated as the current account balance divided by GDP.
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the sector is continuing to adjust the imbalances built up, and there are no signs that the 
expansionary phase has begun. Accordingly, nor does this indicator emit signals favouring 
the activation of the CCB.
Therefore, both the central indicators and the information analysed currently offer mutually 
consistent and sufficiently homogeneous signals supporting the decision not to activate 
the CCB at present.
Reciprocity framework for macroprudential measures in the EU. Initial steps
Notable among the most recent changes in the macroprudential regulatory field are a new 
recommendation by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) on the reciprocity framework 
for EU Member States.8 While EU Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV)9 and Regulation (EU) 
8  Recommendation ESRB/2015/2 on the assessment of cross-border effects of and voluntary reciprocity for 
macroprudential policy measures.
9  EU Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity 
of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 
2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC.
The information analysed 
consistently and 
homogeneously supports the 
decision not to activate the CCB
The ESRB has approved the 
reciprocity framework for 
macroprudential measures 
in the EU…
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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575/2013 (CRR)10 contained provisions which, for certain instruments, stipulated the 
obligation of reciprocity11, there was no general framework for macroprudential instruments 
as a whole.
This initiative of the ESRB reflects the awareness that macroprudential measures may 
have cross-border effects, or prove insufficient domestically if they do not oblige all agents, 
including those belonging to another jurisdiction, who are involved in the formation of the 
risk it is sought to curb (see Chart 3.3). For instance, if risks are detected in the housing 
market, the macroprudential authority may set, inter alia, an increase in the risk weightings 
of mortgage loans in order to restrict the growth of credit activity in this segment by 
increasing the consumption of capital of these exposures. But if the measure is only 
applied to institutions regulated by the national authority (i.e. if there is no reciprocity 
mechanism), undesirable effects may arise, such as the recourse of the private sector to 
non-resident banks to obtain mortgage financing, which might neutralise the measure 
taken. Another illustrative case would be the requirement of an additional capital buffer in 
the face of excessive credit growth, which may have a bearing not only on the granting of 
credit at the domestic level but also on that of other jurisdictions (cross-border effect) in 
which the presence of the national banking sector is significant.
The cross-border nature of macroprudential policy highlights the need for an inter-
jurisdictional cooperative framework that recognises the application of the measures 
approved by the national supervisor outside its legal scope. The aim here is to seek to 
increase the effectiveness and consistency of regulation, which is important in a region 
such as the EU which has a high degree of financial integration. The underlying idea is to 
ensure that exposure to the same risk has an equivalent regulatory treatment irrespective 
of the jurisdiction to which the agents concerned belong.
10  Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential re-
quirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
11  Specifically, for the countercyclical capital buffer (up to 2.5%) and for the requirement of an increase in risk 
weighting or of a greater LGD (Loss Given Default) for real estate exposures, there is an obligation to adopt 
equivalent measures in national jurisdiction.
…with the aim of curbing 
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irrespective of the jurisdiction 
to which agents belong
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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The procedure to activate cross-country reciprocity is relatively straightforward. The ESRB 
recommendation stipulates that the national authority that approves a macroprudential 
measure should, before the adoption of new measures, assess the potential cross-border 
effects, both in its own jurisdiction and outside it. If there is an observed need to request 
reciprocity of other EU Member States, the ESRB will be duly notified, and will assess the 
request and, where appropriate, will recommend reciprocity to the other Member States in 
respect of the exposure their respective institutions have in that country.12 Finally, the authorities 
of the other Member States shall apply the same measure as that approved in the requesting 
country, or the measure most equivalent thereto were it not to exist under national legislation, 
in addition to informing the ESRB.
As with all ESRB recommendations, obligatory compliance is not demanded, but it is necessary 
to properly explain the reasons in the event of failure to comply. Indeed, there is one justified 
reason for non-compliance, given that the ESRB recommendation provides for an exemption 
in the application of reciprocity for cases in which exposure to the macroprudential risk identified 
is not material. This “non-materiality” principle does not alter the essential objective sought by 
the reciprocity framework (effectiveness and consistency of the macroprudential measures 
across jurisdictions), and lessens the regulatory burden to which institutions are subject. The 
second qualifying factor concerns the nature of the reciprocity. In principle, reciprocity cannot 
be said to be automatic, since compliance with ESRB recommendations is not obligatory.
The Banco de España has adopted the ESRB recommendation, and has begun to assess the 
reciprocity requests made by other Member States. To date, there have been two reciprocity 
requests under the framework described. The first was a request from Belgium to raise the 
risk weightings of mortgage exposures, measured by the IRB method, by 5 pp.13 The second 
was a request from Estonia to introduce a systemic risk buffer of 1% applicable not only 
to institutions supervised by the Estonian authority but also to the branches of non-resident 
institutions and to cross-border activity in this market.14 In both cases the Banco de España 
has determined, following criteria agreed within the ESRB, that Spanish institutions’ exposures 
to these countries do not meet the materiality thresholds susceptible to contributing to the 
macroprudential risks detected in the countries requesting reciprocity. Accordingly, it has not 
been necessary to adopt any measure.
In the future, reciprocity requests are likely to continue to be made as the Member States 
progressively make use of the macroprudential toolkit available in the regulations. The Banco de 
España will continue studying each request individually, while regularly assessing the cross-
border impact of its own macroprudential decisions, and the advisability of requesting reciprocity 
of other Member States. In addition, given the growing inter-dependence among the European 
countries’ financial systems, it will be necessary to reflect on what the most suitable conceptual 
framework should be to assess the cross-border effects of macroprudential policy.
Countercyclical capital buffer in third countries
The potential cross-border effects of macroprudential policy are not confined to the area 
of the EU described above; rather, there may be inter-dependencies with other countries. 
12  The ESRB has other alternatives to pure reciprocity if, in the cost-benefit analysis, it is determined that the measure 
to be reciprocated entails costs that are difficult for other Member States to assume. These include amending the 
measure or considering replacing it with another with a better cost-benefit trade-off. Ultimately, the ESRB may not 
recommend reciprocity if the cross-border effects are substantial and cannot be reasonably mitigated.
13  Recommendation ESRB/2016/3. The Belgian authorities resorted to Article 458 of the CRR (“flexibility package”) 
in order to approve this measure.
14 Recommendation ESRB/2016/4. Articles 133-134 of the CRD IV.
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However, while the application of reciprocity is automatic for the CCB within the EU, it is 
not so for third countries outside the EU. This has recently led the ESRB to publish a 
recommendation in this connection.15 The aim of the recommendation is to help EU 
Member States determine in a uniform fashion – if the CCB set in third countries does not 
seem appropriate – a CCB in respect of their exposures to the same country outside the 
EU. In this way it is sought to avoid regulatory arbitrage opportunities among European 
countries that have materially significant exposures to the same non-Community country 
and, in turn, to ensure a suitable degree of protection for the European banking system 
against systemic risks due to excessive credit growth that may arise in non-EU countries.
As with the previous recommendation, this recommendation has also been adopted by the 
Banco de España. The first step needed for compliance with the recommendation is the 
specification, by the Banco de España, of the “material countries” for Spanish banks. That 
is to say, those non-EU countries with which the Spanish banking system has significant 
exposures. For a country to be classified as material, it has been established that risk-
weighted exposures to this country should exceed a given percentage of the total of risk-
weighted exposure, following the methodology proposed by the ESRB. This threshold has 
been set at 2%.
The results of the study conducted, with data as at December 2015, identify the countries 
above the 2% threshold of total risk-weighted exposures as, in descending order of 
exposure, the United States, Brazil, Mexico, Turkey and Chile. On aggregate, these five 
countries account for around 85% of the Spanish banking system’s exposure to third 
countries, measured in terms of risk-weighted assets. Bearing in mind that total exposure 
to third countries is 30.6%, this list of five countries may be considered as covering most 
of the risks arising from exposures to third countries, hence it does not seem necessary to 
monitor the other countries so exhaustively in terms of the potential use of a CCB for these 
exposures.
As discussed, the fundamental aim of this recommendation is to prevent problems arising 
from excessive credit growth in these countries from generating systemic risks in Spain. In 
this connection, the Banco de España will specially monitor credit cycle developments in 
the selected countries. This monitoring will be in coordination with the ESRB, which is 
conducting a similar analysis on the countries that are material for the EU as a whole.
15  Recommendation ESRB/2015/1 recognising and setting countercyclical buffer rates for exposures to third countries.
...recognition and setting 
of the CCB for exposures 
to countries outside the EU
The Banco de España has 
adopted this measure, defining 
material countries as those 
in which the risk-weighted 
exposures held by Spanish 
institutions exceed 2% of total 
exposure
The countries exceeding this 
threshold as at December 
2015 are the United States, 
Brazil, Mexico, Turkey and 
Chile…
… whereby the Banco de 
España, in coordination with 
the ESRB, will subject credit 
developments in these 
countries to special monitoring
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4 ANNEX
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Difference between funds received in liquidity-providing operations and funds delivered in absorbing operations. July 2016 data (latest available) and July 2015 
data, to maintain the year-on-year comparison.
b Difference calculated in basis points.
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ANNEX 2
SOURCE: Banco ?? España.
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